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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the recognition policy of the
United States toward Soviet Russia in the years immediately
following the October Revolution of 1917, The traditional
roots of American recognitional policy and their application
to the problem of Soviet Russia are emphasized.
It is shown that American policy was characterized by
what George Kennan has called a "legalistic-moralistic"
approach. This led to a virtual deadlock by 1923 of diplo-
matic relations—an impasse which continued until Franklin D,
Roosevelt became President in 1933.
The conclusion is drawn that this policy of non-
recognition was a result of the economic, political, and
social pressures which shape American political thinking
during the period. It was, in addition, an unproductive
policy which failed to seek out and to exploit the potential
of realistic diplomacy.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
At the beginning of the year 1933, only the United
States of all the Great Powers of the world still stood out
against maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union. On November 7, 1933, M. Litvinov arrived in the
United States from Russia to negotiate the resumption of
diplomatic relations. The negotiations continued until
November 16, at which time the points on which agreement had
been reached were set forth in a number of communications
between President Roosevelt and Foreign Commissar Litvinov,
The long drought was over—or such was the hope.
Now sixteen years is a short time as the events of
history are measured. It is, however, a relatively long
time for one Great Power to refuse formally to recognize
another. In stating the fundamental reason for the American
policy of nonrecognition, Samuel F. Bemis termed it "the
irreconcilability of the revolutionary communist theory and
practice of government with the theory and practice of
American democracy and capitalism."
A study of the volume of the diplomatic correspond-
ence between the United States and the Soviet Union for the
Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United
States (London: Jonathan F. Cape, 1937), pp. 728-729.
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2years from 1917 to 1933, as contained in the United States
Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States , reveals a striking fact. The years
from 1917 through 1923 are marked by a fairly heavy volume
of correspondence. The years of 1924 through 1932 are
characterized by a slender volume of diplomatic correspond-
ence, which does pick up again in 1933 to a more normal
level.
What had happened was that by 1923 the official stand
of the United States toward recognition of the Soviet Union
had become so hardened that any official attempts to open
the topic from any quarter were effectively squelched.
There existed from 1923 to 1933 a form of diplomatic "dead
time" between the two nations which was finally broken by
the overtures of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the
Soviets.
The approach in this paper will be to make a critical
study of the recognition policy of the United States toward
Soviet Russia from the years 1917 through 1923. This time
period has been chosen on the basis that it constitutes an
effective entity in itself of the Soviet recognition problem.
The past recognition policies of the United States
will be briefly examined in order to form a background
against which to examine the recognition policies of the
Democratic Administration of President Woodrow Wilson and
M*#d
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3the Republican Administrations of Presidents Harding and
Coolidge. The successive Presidential Administrations will
be compared and contrasted as to Soviet recognition policy*
Related issues as the debt question, trade, and domestic
pressures will be examined in some detail*
A salient feature of any study of the diplomatic
history of the united States in the period following World
War I is that this was an era in which there existed for the
United States what could be called an option of participa-
tion as a Great Power in the events of the world* Great
Britain and Prance felt impelled to establish relations with
Russia by the mid-twenties. The United States was under no
such compulsion* It was able to indulge in its whims almost
at will* The future day of reckoning was not yet in sight*
In his book, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 , George Kennan
makes two observations which aid in the understanding of
this very interesting period of American political thinking:
• • • it is clear that there has been in the past a
very significant gap between challenge and response
in our conduct of foreign policy; that this gap still
exists; and that, whereas fifty years ago it was not
very dangerous to us, today (1951) it puts us in grave
peril.
^
The second observation is as follows:
As you have no doubt surmised, I see the most serious
fault of our past policy formation to be in something
2George P* Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New
York: The New American Library, 1952;, p. 81.
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that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach
to international problems* This approach runs like a
red skein through our foreign policy.
It is the belief that it should be possible to
suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of
government in the international field by the accept-
ance of some system of rules and restraints, 3
Kennan*s observations are pertinent because the
period from 1917 to 1933 was a period in which our foreign
policy lagged. The years of the Presidency of Woodrow
Wilson were certainly moralistic and those of his Republican
successor certainly legalistic. The combined term
"legalistic-moralistic," moreover, has a very real applica-
tion in that the policies of Republicans and Democrats alike
combined features of both. It was a matter of degree.
Finally, the conclusions of this author will fall
into two areas. First will be a summation of recognitional
principles and recognitional policy as they applied to the
time period studied. Second, the validity of the American
policy of nonrecognition will be considered. Should the
United States have recognized the Soviet Union at an earlier
time, or was there really no sounder approach than was
applied?
The chief sources of data have been the files of the
3Ibid., p. 83.
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5Department of state section of the National Archives which
pertain to Russia and the Department of state Series Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States * In
addition, past issues of The New York 'imes for the early
recognition period have been consulted where possible*
Secondary sources have been employed as necessary to fill in
accounts, but the approach has been to utilize primary
source material to the fullest possible extent as a basis
for conclusions*

CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES RECOGNITION POLICY TO X917
The purpose of this chapter Is to present a brief
sketch of the recognition policies of the United States up
to the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in November of 1917*
There has been in American diplomacy a mainstream of recog-
nition policy since the days of Thomas Jefferson as Secre-
tary of State* From this main channel, American statesmen
(such as, Seward, Wilson, and Hughes) have occasionally
strayed, but the ultimate result has always been a return to
the main channel, which is termed de facto recognition*
John Bassett Moore has defined recognition as "the
assurance given to a new state that it will be permitted to
hold its place and rank, in the character of an independent
political organism, in the society of nations • " Recogni-
tion is important because, although "the rights and attri-
butes of sovereignty belong to it independently of all
recognition, • . • it is only after it has been recognized
2that it is assured exercising them*"
Recognition has traditionally taken two forms—de
John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law
(New Yorks Government Printing Office, 1906) , I, 72*
2Ibid*
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7jure and de facto * The act of recognition itself is not de
jure or de facto , but "the state or government, as the case
may be" is so recognized* De jure recognition in its
original form connotated that a state had acquired power by
legal measures and thus was assured of legitimacy. De facto
recognition has meant the fact of effective control of the
state* If the new government could carry out its inter
-
4
national obligations, it should be recognized de facto *
The terms have come to indicate more a matter of degree—
with de facto recognition being of a provisional nature*
Thus, for example, Great Britain refused to recognize Russia
from 1917 to 1921* In 1921, she recognized the Russian
government de facto and in 1924 de jure * Then, in 1927,
**" VMMMM tm^MMlMMM MNMMWk 4HNMHMHIMM* "
Great Britain broke off relations with Soviet Russia but did
5
not withdraw recognition*
The concept of recognition as It developed in the
United States was the handiwork of Thomas Jefferson* Jeffer-
son's concepts of popular sovereignty and the right of
revolution caused him to "break with the legitimist theorists
3
J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1963), p."T?7T"
Julius Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United
States (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and
Public Law* New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1915),
Vol* LXYI, No* 1, p. 66*
5Brierly, op * clt *. pp. 147-148.
lOO fc
I
3 JtVOv. ft
'
0©Y M»N
8
6
of the eighteenth century* " In The Declaration of Inde-
pendence , Jefferson wrote that:
. . . whenever any form of government becomes
destructive of these ends (life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness ) , it is the right of the
people to alter or abolish it, and to institute
new government.'
From this position, Jefferson, as Secretary of State,
evolved the two principles which have been essential to
United States recognition ever since—de facto control and
popular approval. In December, 1792, in a statement of
principle on American attitude toward changes in French
government, he wrote to Mr* Pinckney in London:
We certainly cannot deny to other nations that
principle whereon our own government is founded, that
every nation has a right to govern itself internally
under what forms it pleases and to change these forms
at its own will; and externally to transact business
with other nations through whatever organ it chooses
whether that be a King, Convention, Committee, Presi-
dent or whatever it may be* The only thing essential
is the will of the nation*®
The traditional policy of the United States has been
termed a de facto one and, indeed, at times, has moved close
to the technical meaning of de facto as connotating merely
effective control of the state—by whatever means* It is
6Goebel, op . cit . , p. 99.
7The Declaration of Independence ( excerpt ) , cited by
Robert M* Lanqdon and WaTEer Norrls, American Foreign Policy
(Paterson, New Jerseys Littlefield, Adams and Co.. 1961),
p. 78.
Paul Leicester Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson
(New York and London, 1905), TT2TT.
ate* v
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9often overlooked that for Jefferson mere de facto control by
the new government was not sufficient. Jefferson also in-
sisted upon popular will being expressed. On November 7,
1792, before he wrote to Plnckney, Jefferson had written to
Gouverneur Morris in Paris to advise him on the French
situation caused by the deposing of the French king:
With what kind of government you do business is
another question* It accords with our principles to
acknolege [sic ] any government to be rightful which
is formed by the will of the nation substantially
declared. The late government was of this kind and
was accordingly acknoleged [sic ] by all branches of
ours. So any alteration of it which shall be made
by the will of the nation substantially declared,
will doubtless be acknoleged [sic ] in like manner.
With such a government every kind of business may be
done. But there are some matters which I conceive
might be transacted with a government de facto; such,
for instance, as the reforming the unfriendly restric-
tion on our commerce and navigation. Such cases you
will readily distinguish when they occur. 9
Taylor Cole, in a study of American recognition
policy, stresses that American policy from the time of
Jefferson has been guided by two criteria, "first, the
present and future stability of the government to be recog-
nized and, second, the willingness and ability of the
government to fulfill its international obligations."
Cole*s statement is not inconsistent with Jefferson* s policy.
9Ibid, VI, 131.
Taylor Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United
States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UniversTEy , 1928)
,
pp. 19-20.
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Jefferson did take de facto control into account but, pri-
marily, he considered stability as "the determining factor"
in determining recognition* The will of the nation was
paramount because all rightful authority found its source in
the people and stability "from a practical viewpoint could
only be found where the people sanctioned the new govern-
A view such as Jefferson* s could be easily perverted.
It was easy to equate the will of the people with simple
control and thus de facto control* As early as 1793, Citi-
zen Gen6t was recognized by the united States as the French
Minister of the new French Republic* There was no investi-
gation into the nature of the new republic other than the
12fact of its effective control of France* The same policy
was followed in extending recognition to the new states of
Latin America, although there was some delay because of in-
volvement with Spain over Florida* Henry Clay pressed for
early recognition and summed up the United States position:
We have constantly proceeded on the principle that
the government de facto is that we can alone notice*
Whatever form o7"government any society of people
adopts, whoever they acknowledge as their sovereign,
we consider that government, or that sovereignty as
Ibid * , p* 22*
12Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward
Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers,
30Oft
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the one to be acknowledged by us* We have invariably
abstained from assuming a right to decide in favor of
the sovereign de jure and against the sovereign de
facto * That is a question for the nation in whicK it
arises to determine* And so far as we are concerned,
the sovereign de facto is the sovereign de jure * * . •
As soon as sta&Tlity and order are maintained, no
matter by whom, we have always considered and ought to
consider the actual as the true government* 13
In the space of time up to the Civil War, the de
facto approach was so consistently followed that it assumed
the character of tradition in American foreign policy*
During the period the United States recognized "new govern-
ments when they in fact come into existence and when they
14promised to be firm and stable*" Goebel asserts, "it
forms one of the distinctive contributions of United States
15diplomacy to the present international system* n
The advent of the Civil War brought new problems to
the United States* Secretary of State Seward wished to
prevent the recognition of the Confederacy abroad and to
deter European intervention in Latin America* He could not
deny the right of revolution as one of the founding prin-
ciples of the United States* Seward's answer was to stress
the element of the approval of the people to the change* As
13Mallory, Life and Speeches of Henry Clay . I, 391,
cited by Julius Goebel. The Recognition Policy of the United
States (Mew York: Longmans, Green and Company ,""T915 ) , p. 123.
14Cole, op * clt * , p* 25*
15
*"Goebel, o£. clt *. p. 221.
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we have seen, such approval had, more often than not, been
16inferred in determining recognition, Seward stressed that
a revolutionary government in a republican state would not
be recognized by the United States if it secured control by
force of arms in defiance of the existing constitution and
against the will of the people. A change of regime by force
must obtain the formal acquiescence and acceptance of the
people*
It can be readily seen that Seward's insistence that
the will of the people be declared was a marked departure
from the previously used de facto principle. This insistence
upon more than mere existence of a government as a criterion
of recognition lasted for some twenty-five years during
which it was customary to insist that a revolutionary govern-
ment demonstrate proof of popular support by an act of
"election or an act of the legislature" before recognition
18
would be extended by the United States. Although there was
then a swing back to de facto recognition, the policy of
Seward had foreshadowed the policies of Woodrow Wilson.
By the 1890' s, the transition back to the earlier de
16Cole, op . clt . t p. 30.
17Julius W. Pratt, A History of U.jS. Foreign Policy
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 177.""
18Ibid.
.
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19facto recognition policy was generally complete. With the
turn of the century, a new element cropped up in American
recognition policy. This was an insistence that nations
live up to their international obligations. That this new
insistence was concomitant with expansion of American inter-
20
ests into foreign lands was no coincidence. Thus, during
the Administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, condi-
tions of recognition were broadened to include "national
self-interest and the protection of commercial agreements
21
made by the former governments with American business.
"
Frequently, recognition was used to force concessions. The
forcing of the Piatt Amendment upon Cuba in 1902 and the
recognition of Panama in 1903 were examples in point.
Thus, the first change in the early nineteenth cen-
tury recognition policy to America was the addition to pre-
vious due facto requirements of the willingness to meet
international responsibilities. It was perhaps inevitable
in view of increasing American investments abroad that the
new emphasis should be colored by American self-interest of
a material nature. The concern for republican institutions
was still present, however, and it was to receive public
19 20Goebel, 0£. cit . , p. 209. Cole, o£. clt . , p. 35.
21
" Robert M. Langdon and Walter Norris, American Foreign
Policy (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co.,
1961), p. 80.
-
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attention from 1913 to 1921 during the Presidency of Woodrow
Wilson*
The years during which Woodrow Wilson was President
were years of vigorous activity in the field of American
recognition both in action and in principle. It has been
generally agreed by historians and others that the years
1913 to 1921 mark a new era in "the acknowledgment of new
22governments and new states*"
The immediate problem of recognition facing President
Wilson was that of the Huerta regime in Mexico* The history
of the case, briefly, was that the dictator-president of
Mexico, Porfirio Diaz, had been overthrown in 1911 in a
revolution led by Francisco X* Madero* Madero succeeded to
power for sixteen months and, in turn, was overthrown by an
army revolt at Mexico City* The man to whom Madero had
trusted his defense was one General Victoriano Huerta*
After betraying Madero, Huerta arrested him, forced him to
23
resign, and then had him shot in a staged escape attempt*
President Taft had taken no steps toward recognition
in the last few days of his term, possibly because the
Department of State hoped to gain "settlement of certain
disputes as the price of recognition." The new President,
22Cole, op * clt *. p. 53*
Pratt, op * cit.
, p* 426*
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Woodrow Wilson, had been shocked by the assassination of
24Madero and refused to deal with Huerta. Soon after coming
to office, Wilson had stated on March 11, 1913s
Co-operation is possible only when supported at
every turn by the orderly processed just government
based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular
force* We hold, as X am sure all thoughtful leaders
of republican governments everywhere hold, that just
government rests always upon the consent of the
governed, and that there can be no freedom without
order based upon law and upon the public conscience
and approval* We shall look to make these principles
the basis of mutual intercourse, respect and help-
fulness between our sister republics and ourselves
*
25
Wilson's view of Huerta was that, while he was in de facto
control of the Mexican government, he had come to office
through assassination* His rule was based on force and
violence rather than the will of the people* Recognition of
Huerta would, therefore, have to await certain imposed con-
ditions: these were—
Cession of all civil warfare, assurance of a free
election, Huerta *s promise not to be a candidate,
and Huerta' s agreement to abide by results of the
election and similar agreements from all other
factions. 26
The political warfare between Wilson and Huerta
finally broke into armed hostility when the united States
24Ibld *. p. 427.
25
Edgar £* Robinson and Victor West, The Foreign
Policy of Woodrow Wilson (New York: The MacmTTlan Co.,
mi)' ?p* i7ft-iiBcc
26Langdon and Norris, op . cit.
, p* 81*

16
occupied Vera Cruz on April 22, 1914, following provocative
acts by Huerta* President Wilson accepted the good offices
of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to mediate the dispute, but
the conference of mediation which met at Niagara Falls in
May could not come to a satisfactory decision* Huerta, how-
ever, resigned on July 15, 1914, and fled to Europe* More
than a year later, on October 19, 1915, the Government of
27Venustiano Carranza was given de facto recognition*
Woodrow Wilson's ideas on recognition as seen in the
Huerta case differed from those of the traditional de facto
school and also from those of Roosevelt and Taft who had
immediately preceded him* Wilson was not opposed to revolu-
tionary change in government, but he would not accept de
facto control as alone being indicative of public will* For
Wilson, the methods by which the new government came to
power were important—whether by civilized or by barbaric
methods* His policy harked back to that of Seward *s but
went even further in requiring that a regime hold the con-
fidence of the people*
Contrary to the attitudes of Roosevelt and Taft,
Wilson was willing to sacrifice material gain for principle*
He refused to use recognition to further the financial
28interests of individuals* This was evident in a statement
27 28Cole, ©£• clt *. pp. 59-60* Ibid *, p* 53.
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of September 2, 1916:
So long as the power of recognition rests with me
the Government of the United States will refuse to
extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power
in a sister republic by treachery and violence* No
permanency can be given the affairs of any republic
by a title based upon intrigue and assassination* I
declared that to be the policy of this Administration
within three weeks after I assumed the presidency* I
here again avow it* I am more interested in the for-
tunes of oppressed men and pitiful women and children
than in any property rights whatever. 29
Although President Wilson *s stand against Huerta
aroused much LatinWtmerican antipathy, there was a good deal
of LatinWVmerican support for Wilson's "constitutional"
approach in which he insisted that new governments acquire
30power within the existing constitutional framework* In
1907. five Central American republics had incorporated in a
treaty* the so-called lobar Doctrine that recognition be
withheld from revolting governments* While the United
States never entered into any specific agreements on the
Tobar Doctrine, it did support the plan* This led, inter-
estingly enough, to a meeting in Washington—from December,
1922, to February, 1923, in which a general treaty of peace
and amity was drawn by the five Central American republics*
29
' James Brown Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy .
Messages . Addresses . Papers (New York; Oxford tihiversity
Press, 19l£), pp* 231-232*
30William L* Neuman, Jr., Recognition of Governments
*** tne Americas (Washington: Foundation for "Foreign Affairs,
"HW7TT p. 13.
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Although the meeting took place under American auspices, the
United States did not become a member of the pact* It did
support the rather elaborate set of principles set forth in
the treaty to militate against Illegal and forceful over-
31throw of government by coup d
»
etat and revolution*
While the recounting of this history of the Tobar
Doctrine gets ahead of the author *s account, which will pick
up in the next chapter with Wilson's recognition problem
over the Soviet Union, it does indicate that, even with the
differing courses taken by various administrations on the
subject of recognlti .*e were continuing policies which
gave continuity from administration to administration*
31Graham H* Stuart, Latin America and the United
States (fifth edition; New Yoric: Appieton-tferTEury-Crofts
,
Inc., 1955), p* 325*

CHAPTER III
WILSON AND RECOGNITION
The great influence abroad of Woodrow Wilson, during
and following World War I, was a result of increasing
respect paid by the world to the position of the United
States as a Great Power and of the impact of the principles
to which Wilson was dedicated. Unfortunately, the people of
the United States lagged behind the world in their percep-
tion and appreciation of these facts.
Despite his perturbation over Russian conditions,
Wilson moved quickly to recognize the new Provisional Govern-
ment when Tsarism collapsed in March, 1917, and was replaced
by a government dedicated to the introduction of Western
political freedom and to the continuation of the war against
Germany. The communication of United States Ambassador to
Russia, David R. Francis, caught some of the emotional im-
pact of the situation.
1107. The six days between last Sunday and this have
witnessed the most amazing revolution. ... I request
respectfully that you promptly give me authority to
recognize Provisional Government as first recognition
is desirable from every viewpoint. 1
Secretary of State Lansing cabled United States recog-
nition of the new government on March 20, 1917. On July 15,
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States - 19T7
"{"Washington : Government Printing Office, 19^6), III, 1207.

20
1917, Professor Boris A. Bakhmetev was received by the
2United States as the accredited representative of Russia*
Soon credits were extended to the new government—'Something
which had not been the case with the government of the Tsar.
The overthrow by the Bolsheviks of the Provisional
Government on November 7, 1917, thus was a most unhappy cul-
mination of events* By their betrayal of budding Russian
democracy and subsequent actions in removing Russia from the
war effort, as well as preaching a doctrine of world revolu-
tion and repudiating past debts and alliances, the Bolshe-
viks soon became an anathema to the United States and to the
Allies in general*
Some two weeks after the Bolsheviks' success, Commis-
sar of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky sent a communication to
the diplomatic corps in Petrograd, announcing the formation
of the Soviet Government and requesting its recognition*
The American Ambassador, David R« Francis, chose to ignore
the message at that time* His lack of reaction unofficially
made the beginning of a sixteen-year interruption in the
3diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States*
2National Archives* Department of State - 861*01
Series. Records of the Department of State Relating to
Internal Affairs o? Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1529 *
3Robert Paul Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American
Diplomacy (Princetons Princeton University Press, 1953)
,
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Official relations were not reinstituted until November 16,
1933.
It soon became evident that the Allies were divided
on any common positive policy toward Russia. The French and
Italians were against any liberalization of war aims. The
British and Americans were initially against military inter-
vention. The only common policy was one of nonrecognition
of the Bolsheviks. Kennan speaks of this action as "charac-
teristic of coalition diplomacy" in which it is as a rule
4possible to agree "only on what not to do."
Despite the mutual antipathy which existed between
Wilson and Lansing, they agreed upon a course of nonrecogni-
tion toward the Bolsheviks. There is little doubt that the
initial policy of the United States was based upon the hope
of the repudiation of the Bolsheviks by the Russian people.
At the least, it was hoped that the Bolsheviks would be
5forced by the people to continue the war against Germany.
There was also a general belief that recognition of the
Bolsheviki would hinder the rise to power of some other
government which would be more willing to prosecute the
6
war.
4George F • Kennan , Russia and the West ( New York
:
The New American Library, 1962)
,
p. 48.
5Browder, op . cit . , p. 4.
Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1944)
,
p.~"Tl5.
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The Wilson-Lansing relationship was one of the inter-
esting features of the half decade preceding 1920* The two
men were almost exactly opposite "in temperament and mental
process* Lansing was practical, skeptical, and keenly
analytical; Wilson was idealistic, moralistic, and intui-
7
tive." Although Lansing was well liked and appreciated by
fellow diplomats and statesmen, President Wilson obviously
held Lansing in no particular esteem. It was a tribute to
Lansing's value to the President that the relationship
lasted so long*—from Lansing's interim appointment as Secre-
tary of -State on June 9, 1915, to relieve William Jennings
Bryan to his summary discharge on February 13, 1920, by an
ailing Wilson* The stature of Lansing has grown with the
passage of time, and he has come to be recognized as "one of
the ablest and most experienced American Secretaries of
State." It must have been considerably galling to the re-
served Lansing to have been continually overshadowed by the
outspoken Woodrow Wilson and his personal adviser, Colonel
E. M. House.
Lansing early expressed the American doubt over the
7
Daniel M. Smith, "Robert Lansing," An Uncertain
Tradition : American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth
Century , Norman A. Graebner (ed.)*TNew York: kcGraw-Hill
&bbk Company, Inc., 1961), p. 103*
Ibid *, p. 101.
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course of events in Russia. Following the December second
armistice between the Central Powers and Russia, he sent a
memorandum to the President*
I confess that I do not feel warranted in hazarding
even a guess as to what the outcome will be. This
makes the adopting of an active policy most difficult.
Historically the Russian situation is unprecedented,
It is wholly novel. It seems to me that the control-
ling forces are idealism and ignorance supported by
weapons
,
....
The correct policy for a government which believes
in political institutions as they now exist and based
on nationality and private property is to leave these
dangerous idealists alone and have no direct dealings
with them. To recognize them would give them an
exalted idea of their own power, make them more inso-
lent and impossible, and win their contempt, not their
friendship.
"Do nothing" should be our policy until the black
period of terrorism comes to an end and the rising
tide of blood has run its course. It cannot last
forever, but Russia will sink lower before better
days come .9
In this memorandum, Lansing not only set the tone of future
American action, but he expressed a deep pessimism for the
future state of Russian affairs. He foresaw a continuing
blood bath which would have to run its course and for which
he had no solution except a passive one of "do nothing."
9Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (New
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1915"), p. 346.
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Lansing reports in his War Memoirs that on December
4, 1917, le had submitted to the President a draft declara-
tion of a memorandum which would be a public statement on
the recognition problem* He said, in part:
This government has found it impossible to recog-
nize Lenin, Trotsky and their associates as the de
facto government of Russia, since there is inadequate
evidence that they are the real agents of the sover-
eignty of the Russian people* • . •
Relying upon a full realisation by the Russian
people of the imminent danger to their political and
territorial integrity from autocratic Germany and
upon their faithful adherence to their cobelligerents,
this government has watched with disappointment and
amazement the rise of class despotism in Petrograd and
the open efforts of the leaders of the Bolshevik! to
withdraw from the conflict even at the expense of
national honor and the future safety of democracy in
Russia. 10
Lansing's object, so he states,
* • • was to avoid offending the Russian people and
at the same time to indicate to them that recognition
by the Bolshevik Government by the United States was
out of the question in view of the character and pur-
poses of that government* 11
In any event, President Wilson did not choose to release
such a public declaration, possibly because he was consider-
ing the famous Fourteen Points , which were subsequently
stated in a special message to Congress on January 8, 1918*
There is evidence that Lansing's position rapidly
hardened* President Wilson had refused to release Lansing's
1QIbld*. p. 343* 11Ibid*
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December 4 Memorandum, but he did direct that "the Russian
12
situation be conducted along those lines." When Ambassa-
dor Francis tentatively brought up the question of possibly
recognising the Bolshevik regime at the end of December,
1917, Lansing refused to consider any change in policy*
Steps were taken to tighten up Russian diplomatic procedures*
Edgar G* Sisson, who was the Petrograd Agent for the Ameri-
can Committee on Public Information, was rebuked for his
interference with diplomatic affairs; General Judson, the
United States Military Attache, was recalled; and Ambassador
Francis was instructed to hew to the policy he had himself
13
earlier recommended* In effect, a policy line was estab-
lished which was later proclaimed more or less officially by
Secretary of State Colby in 1920, reasserted by Secretary of
State Hughes during the Harding and Coolidge Administrations,
and which did not end until Soviet Russia was recognized by
the United States on November 16, 1933*
There is little doubt but that President Woodrow
Wilson's Fourteen Points represented, in part, an attempt to
go even further than the Bolsheviks in setting up a liberal
program for peace* At the time, Wilson believed that the
Brest-Litovsk negotiations "had been permanently suspended ."
Article Six dealt directly with the Russian problem* Wilson
Ibid*, p* 345* Dulles, ojp_* cit*, p. 117.
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set the tone by stating that
the treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations
in the months to come will be the acid test of their
goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as dis-
tinguished from their own interests, and of their
intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
^
4
The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk seemed to
reinforce the nonrecognition stand of the United States
towards the Soviet Union, The treaty posed many problems
for Wilson's plans for a final peace. Secretary of State
Lansing stated the official attitude of the United States
:
• • • since the so-called Soviet Government upon
which Germany has just forced • • • peace was never
recognized by the Government of the United States as
even a government de facto . ... [N]one of its acts,
therefore, need be officially recognized by this
government. *5
American public opinion was becoming increasingly
anti-Bolshevik. The crudely-expressed tenets of Bolshevism
in the political, economic, and social fields with their
avowed goal of universalism through world revolution were
repugnant to the American point of view and, particularly,
to that of the idealistic Woodrow Wilson. Thus, Wilson's
initial policy of watchful waiting became increasingly a
pursuit of the "Wilsonian principle of not recognizing any
14Ibid . t p. 120.
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
^° tne Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918 , Russia
TWashington : Government Printing Office, 1931), I, 397.
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government that did not conform to the American pattern of
16international morals*"
The problem of intervention became the sorest point
of contention between the United States and Soviet Russia*
Initially, both Wilson and Lansing were against intervention
in Northern Russia and in Siberia* Under intense pressure
from the Allies, Wilson finally broke down and agreed to
limited intervention* In Northern Russia, the justification
was the need to safeguard Allied supplies; in Siberia, it
was to protect the Czechoslovak legion* In practicality,
the entire issue of intervention was more complex* Cer-
tainly, there was the hope on the part of the United States
that limited intervention would aid the development of an
anti-Bolshevik Government* Time proved this hope to be in
vain*
Another hope for the early rise of an anti-Bolshevik
Government sprang from the tenuous existence of the Bolshevik
regime in competition with several movements against it* In
anticipation of the inability of the Bolsheviks to retain
power, the United States considered aid to several separatist
movements* As early as December 10, 1917, Lansing viewed
the movement of General Kaledin and his Don Cossacks as a
16Norman A. Graebner (ed*) v The Cold War (Boston:
D. C* Keath and Company, 1963), p* "SS7 cltingRfichard W. Van
Alstyne, "The United States and Russia* M
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17possible supplanter of the Bolsheviks. The various move-
ments, such as those of General Kaledin, General Denikin,
and Admiral Kolchak among others, floundered on the shoals
of ineptitude and internal dissension, however* At no time
was de facto recognition extended to any of the separatist
regimes, but United States aid to these movements served, as
did intervention efforts, to incur the ill-will of the
Bolsheviks.
President Wilson made several efforts to find a solu-
tion to the Russian enigma. On January 22, 1919, he submitted
the Prinklpo Plan to Allied planners at the Qual d»Orsay,
Paris. A plan was approved for ail organized groups in
Russia to send representatives to the Princes Islands, Sea
18
of Marmara, to settle their differences. The Bolsheviks
accepted, but other groups would have no part in a meeting
which would include the Bolsheviks; and the plan was aban-
doned •
Another effort was the sending of William C. Bullitt,
a staff member of the American Peace Commission, to Russia
on a secret mission to find a solution to some of the vexing
17
tgt
18
United States Department of State, The Lansing Papers
(Washing on; Government Printing Office, 1940), II, 343.
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to t**e Foreign Relations of the United States , 1919T"Russla
Twashington : Government Printing Office, 193 7), III, ^l.
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problems which separated the United States and Russia*
Bullitt entered Russia on March 16, 1919 , and was impressed
by the orderly control exercised by the Bolsheviks over
territory under their control* Convinced of the inevita-
bility of socialism in Russia, Bullitt drew up with the
Soviet leaders an agreement which was to be instituted be-
tween Russia and the Allies* The document, dated March 12,
1919, laid the basis for a conference to negotiate peace
between Russia and the Allies* Unfortunately, when Bullitt
returned to Paris, he found Wilson preoccupied with other
problems and received a cold shoulder* In addition, the
campaign of Admiral Kolchak was going well at the time*
Bullitt became embittered and resigned from the American
19Peace Delegation to return to the United States*
Throughout the tortured remainder of Wilson* s days in
office, he continued his policy of not recognizing the Bol-
sheviks* After Lansing was fired by Wilson on February 13,
1920, he was replaced by Bainbridge Colby, who held much the
same views as did both Wilson and Lansing on Russian recog-
nition* In reply to a request by the Italian Ambassador
concerning the United States views of the Russian-Polish
situation, Secretary Colby set forth, on August 10, 1920,
19Browder, op * cit * , p. 11.
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what is generally regarded as the most comprehensive exposi-
tion of the Wilson Administration's attitude toward Russia*
That the present rulers of Russia do not rule by
the will or the consent of any considerable proportion
of the Russian people is an incontestable fact* • • •
At the moment when the work of creating a popular
representative government, based upon universal suf-
frage, was nearing completion, the Bolsheviks,
although in number an inconsiderable minority of the
people, by force and cunning seized the power and
machinery of government, and have continued to use
them with savage oppression to maintain themselves
in power. 20
Colby further stated that it was impossible for the Govern-
ment of the United States to recognise the Soviet Government
because it "is based upon the negation of every principle of
honor and good faith and every usage and convention under-
lying the whole structure of international law." The Soviet
Government refused to fulfill its international obligations
and was wholeheartedly pledged to world revolution* "They
have made it quite plain that they intend to use every
means, including, of course, diplomatic agencies, to promote
such revolutionary movements in other countries*" The
United States could not find any "common ground upon which
it can stand with a power whose conception of International
20United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to fchs foreign Relations of the United States , 1920 (Wash-
ington i Government Printing Office, 1936), III, 466*
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relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly re-
21pugnant to its moral sense*
"
Secretary Colby reinforced his 1920 pronouncement with
a statement to the press on January 30, 1920, near the end
of the Wilson Administration.
• . . [the] refusal to recognize the Soviet Govern-
ment was due in the first place to the fact that it
was itself the denial of self-determination to the
Russian people, being a rule by men who violently
usurped power and destroyed the democratic character
of the Russian People's Government* Even more so,
however, it was due to the fact that the Soviet
authorities announced that they would not be bound by
any of their solemn pledges, freely entered into, and
the further fact that by their actions, in the case
of several friendly nations, they have lived up to
that announcement. There can be no useful and har-
monious cooperation toward the end of placing civili-
zation upon a sound basis with such men. 22
There are a number of points about Wilson's policy of
nonrecognition of the Soviet Union which stand out* First,
it seems that Wilson had small choice at the time to do
other than he did. Considering the confused nature of the
intelligence of the times, and the crude, offensive actions
of the Bolsheviks, Wilson had to wait. It would not have
been prudent, considering the doubtful prospects of the Bol-
shevik Government, to have done otherwise*
21Ibid., pp. 466-468*
22The New York Times t January 30, 1921, cited by N.
D* Houghton , "Policy of the United States and other Nations
with Respect to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet
Government, 1917-1929," International Concillation t No* 247
(February, 1929), p* 19.
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Second, Wilson stood upon principle* He refused to
recognise the Soviet Government because (1) it did not have
the sanction of the Russian people 9 and (2) it refused to
respect its international obligations. As has been brought
out in Chapter II, prior to Wilson, the recognition policy
of the united States could be said, in general, to be a tra-
ditional one of recognizing any government no matter what
its character so long as it, in fact, exercised control over
the area of the state—that is , recognition of de facto
governments* In dealing with the Huerta regime in Mexico in
1913, Wilson stressed the methods by which the new govern-
ment secured supremacy, whether civilized or barbaric, and
to what extent recognition would further the cause of democ-
racy*
Wilson found the nature of the Bolsheviks morally
repugnant to him* The development of the Bolshevik Govern-
ment made it natural for Wilson to carry his Mexican policy
over to the Soviets* Regardless of the effectiveness of
such policies of recognition, Wilson was being consistent
when he applied them to the Bolsheviks* The chief criticism
that can be made of Wilson's position is that such a policy
is susceptible of becoming dogmatic and essentially negative*
23But it was, as Kennan puts it, "based squarely on principle • "
23Kennan, op * cit*, p* 197.
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As such, it is consistent with the morally idealistic tone
of Wilson's philosophy* The Allies had started off on much
the same tack as the united States, but for reasons of self-
interest found it expedient to reverse their positions during
the 1920* s; the United States did not*
Such i then, was the inheritance of the new Republican
Administration of Warren Gamaliel Harding* Under the
leadership of the new Secretary of State, Charles Evans
Hughes , the policy of recognition was to continue* There
was a difference, however* Wilson** approach of moral prin-
ciple was to give way to a more pragmatic interpretation of
what constituted international responsibility*
•
CHAPTER IV
HUGHES AND RECOGNITION
Charles Evans Hughes presided over the return of
American foreign relations to so-called "normalcy" in the
early nineteen twenties. He became Secretary of State on
March 4, 1921* Between 1921 and 1925 , he served under two
Presidents, Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. rhe
relationship which had existed between Wilson and Lansing
was now reversed* Both Harding and Coolidge had but a
limited knowledge of foreign affairs and were content to
leave the international field largely to their Secretary
of State while they concentrated upon domestic politics*
Hughes, although lacking expert knowledge in the inter-
national field, was a politician and a lawyer with "general
characteristics of high intelligence, unquestioned integrity,
and political availability*"
Hughes came into office at a time when the tide of
nationalism was running high* There was a public disillu-
sionment with diplomats which, coupled with a rising feeling
of Isolationism at home and resentment of the United States
abroad, made for difficulty in directing the foreign
Norman A* Graebner, ied»), An Uncertain Tradition t
American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century TTfew
York: McGraw-Hill Book" Company , Inc., 1961), p* 131, citing
John Chalmers Vinson, "Charles Evans Hughes."
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2
relations of the United States* Congress, reflecting the
mood of the public, was interested in gaining Congressional
control of all policies*
As a politician and a lawyer, Hughes recognised the
mood of the times* It was perhaps inevitable that he "would
adopt a narrow, factual, and legalistic view of the office
of Secretary of State* He was once characterized as the
'diplomat of legalism, the diplomat of constitutionalism* 1 "
For Hughes, it was simply a further step to take Wilson's
fundamental concept of a world based upon law and to inject
his own brand of legal view* This also offered a way to
come off the lonely Wilsonian perch of pure principle* It
also fitted the Republican approach--which was the desire of
the people at that time—to perfection, no matter if the
Communists ridiculed it as a typical capitalistic viewpoint
destined to bury itself* In short, Hughes returned to an
earlier emphasis of his predecessors to protect American
business* Hughes had never approved, for instance, Wilson's
4
"laxity" in "dealing with Mexico*" This must have included
Wilson's lack of regard for American business interests*
2Dexter Perkins, Charles JSvans Hughes and American
Democratic Statesmanship { Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1956), p. 9&i
Vinson, o£* cit.
,
p* 132.
4
Perkins, op * cit *. p* 132*
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Thus, Hughes retained elements of Wilson* s moral approach to
recognition, but they took a definite back seat to more
strictly defined "legalistic" interests.
The effects of Hughes's pragmatic approach toward
recognition were early evident* Left over from the Wilson
Administration was a refusal to recognize the Obregon Govern-
ment of Mexico. The United States proposed a treaty of amity
and commerce which was "to remove all causes of difference
5between them*" President Obregon objected to certain parts
of the treaty and refused to buy recognition at such a price*
Thereupon, Secretary Hughes gave his view of the situation
on June 7, 1921, in a formal pronouncement.
The fundamental question which confronts the
Government of the United States in considering its
relations with Mexico is the safeguarding of prop-
erty rights against confiscation. ... Whenever
Mexico is ready to give assurance that she will
perform her fundamental obligation In the protec-
tion both of persons and of rights of property
validly acquired, there will be no obstacles to
the most advantageous relations between the two
peoples. ... The question of recognition is a
subordinate one, but there will be no difficulty
as to this, for If General Obregon is ready to
negotiate a proper treaty it is drawn so as to be
negotiated with him and the making of the treaty
in proper form will accomplish the recognition of
the Government that makes it.6
5Taylor Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United
States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1928),
p* 74.
6Ibid., p. 75.
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The face value of this rather bold pronouncement, of course,
was that Mexico could have recognition if she met the
demands for guaranteeing American oil and property rights*
Mexico refused; and the dispute dragged on until a mutual
agreement, which was very satisfactory to the United States,
was reached on August 31, 1923, and the Mexican Government
7
of Obregon was finally recognized* For our purposes, how*
ever, the importance of the Mexican episode Is to demon-
strate Hughes's regard for property rights and his basic
approach to what he considered international responsibility
to be in regard to recognition* Just as during Wilson's
Administration, the conduct of the recognition problem with
Mexico found a Russian parallel*
The change of United States Administration from Demo-
cratic to Republican in 1921 found Moscow entertaining the
hope that the Republican victory would bring about a change
in American policy toward Russia* Moscow, itself, had an-
nounced in March, 1921, the New Economic Policy, or HEP,
which represented a marked change in Soviet internal eco-
nomic policy* The NEP, the end of the civil war, and the
Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement presaged an apparent willing-
ness to negotiate on the part of the Soviets* On March 21,
1921, shortly after the inauguration of President Harding,
7Ibid* t p. 77.
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Maxim Litvinov transmitted an appeal for the resumption of
relations between the two nations from M* Kalinin, President
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee* The message
mentioned the previous aversion of President Wilson to the
Soviet Union and stated the hope that the new American
Government would perceive the advantages of "the re-
establishment of business relations and will consider the
interests of both people which imperatively demand that the
wall existing between them should be removed* w The pledge
8
of noninterference in American affairs was renewed.
The answer by Hughes, the new Secretary of State,
speedily dashed any illusion Moscow may have entertained
concerning the position of the new Republican Administra-
tion. On March 25, Hughes said:
The Government of the United States views with
deep sympathy and grave concern the plight of the
people of Russia and desires to aid by every appro-
priate means in promoting proper opportunities
through which commerce can be established upon a
sound basis* It is manifest to this Government
that in existing circumstances there is no assurance
for the development of trade, as the supplies which
Russia might now be able to obtain would be wholly
inadequate to meet her needs, and no lasting good
can result so long as the present causes of progres-
sive impoverishment continue to operate* It is only
in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope
for the Russian people and it is Idle to expect
resumption of trade until the economic basis of
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States. ?2lT"cWash-
ington : Government Printing Office, 1936), II , 763-764
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production are securely established. Production is
conditional upon the safety of life, the recognition
of firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity
of contracts and the rights of free labor*
If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving
due regard for the protection of persons and property
and the establishment of conditions essential to the
maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad
to have convincing evidence of the consummation of
such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this
Government is unable to perceive that there is any
proper basis for considering trade relations* 9
This meant, of course, that the Harding Administra-
tion was not going to change the basic United States policy
of nonrecognition of the Soviet union. There was here cer-
tainly an increased emphasis upon economic rehabilitation*
It is noteworthy that the Secretary of Commerce at this time
was Herbert Hoover, who held very strong anti-Bolshevik
views* The United States and the Western Governments had
pursued a more or less common policy of nonrecognition
since November of 1917, but "with the lifting of the eco-
nomic blockade by the Supreme Council in January, 1920, how-
ever, the united front began to crack* This was followed
by the signing of a British-Soviet trade agreement on March
16, 1921, by Sir Robert Home and Leonid Krassin* In
effect, of course, this created a de. facto recognition by
Ibid *, p. 768.
Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward
Russia Since 1917 (New Yorki International Publishers,
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Great Britain and brought the attention of the commercial
world to the possibilities of trade with the Soviet Union*
Since the United States had itself lifted the ban against
commercial dealings with Moscow in 1920, it foi , there-
fore, that the Department of State was very concerned over
the combined question of recognition and trade.
The prime objective of the United States appears to
11have been an 'economic rehabilitation" of Russia* The New
economic Policy of the Bolsheviks was considered an encour-
aging step in the "right" direction, and it must have been
hoped that nonrecognition would keep the pressure on and
speed up the economic change* The fact that similar tactics
had been tried and proved unsuccessful in regard to the
basic political nature of the Soviet regime since 191? did
not bode well for the venture with economic pressure*
Through 1921 and 1922, a number of events occurred on
the periphery of the recognition problem with the Soviet
Union* There was the famine relief program which lasted
from 1921 into 1923 and was responsible for saving many
Russian lives* There were also the conferences with Russia
at Geneva and the Hague* These will be hed upon in the
next chapter* Two other events were the ending of the
11Ibid., p* 202*
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Ambassadorship of Bakhmetev and the recognition of the
Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia*
The position of Ambassador Boris Bakhmetev as Ambas-
sador of Russia had been somewhat anomalous since the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917* Despite the fact that he
represented no real government, Jsr* Bakhmetev continued to
be recognized by the United States as Ambassador of Russia
for nearly five years* There was initially some basis for
the procedure* There was the constant anticipation of the
downfall of the Bolsheviks* There was also the expedient
presence of someone to handle the business transactions
which carried over from the Kerensky Government* In view of
the repudiation by the Bolsheviks of past debts and respon-
sibilities, this was a considerable service* Last, it would
appear that the entire matter was characterised by inertia*
The united States began by playing the waiting game and
merely continued to do so, despite the fact that the situa-
tion daily grew more ridiculous*
This rump legation indeed lacked not for funds and
influence* In addition to unexpended credits made available
previously to the Kerensky Provisional Government, there was
a large amount of Russian assets in the United States to be
liquidated*
Politically, Bakhmetev continued to make himself
heard on all matters involving Russia* As titular head of
mvmbaBqpBau
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the not inconsiderable group of Russian emigres from Czarist
and Provisional Government days, the Ambassador from Russia
had a good deal of influence. With good reason, also, the
Bolsheviks protested against the financial and material aid
furnished to the separatist groups, such as that of Admiral
Kolchak in Siberia, by Bakhstetev.
The conclusion of intervention and the triumph of the
Bolsheviks put an end to any hopes Bakhraetev might have
entertained. On April 28, 1922, he notified Secretary
Hughes that he proposed to retire on June 30, 1922. The
financial attache, Serge Ughet, was proposed in the role of
12
Russian agent and custodian of property. Secretary Hughes
replied the next day that he agreed
• • • inasmuch as the liquidation and final set-
tlement of the business of the Russian Government in
the United States for which you were responsible is
now practically completed, and as your continuance
as Ambassador under the existing circumstances may
give rise to misunderstanding. 3-3
Mr. Serge Ughet remained with his diplomatic status un-
changed. Thus, Ambassador Bakhmetev's status was terminated.
But Hughes let it be known in a formal statement on June 4,
1922, that nothing had really changed.
12
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations o£ the United StatesTT9?2 (Wash-
ington J Government PrlntIng"15Ffice , 1937), tl , 875-876
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The termination of Mr. Bakhmeteff 's duties as
Russian Ambassador in this country has no bearing
whatsoever upon the question of the recognition of
the Soviet regime in Russia, which is entirely a
separate matter. 14
One of Wilson's policies toward the Russian matter was
a respect for Russia's territorial integrity. From the Four-
teen Points on, President Wilson insisted that Russia not be
dismembered at the Peace Conference table or elsewhere. In
the previously-mentioned Colby note of August, 1920, the
united States had refused to recognize any dismemberment or
the granting of independence to certain regions with the
15legitimate exception of Poland, Finland, and Armenia.
Requests from various people seeking independence,
such as the Ukrainians, were repeatedly turned down. The
policy was that "Russia's co-operation and agreement" must
16be a pre-requisite. This position in regard to the Baltic
States proved difficult to maintain particularly since Moscow
Itself had proclaimed the independence of the Baltic
States. Following Allied recognition of Estonia and Latvia
on January 27, 1921, and of Lithuania on June 20, 1922, the
N. D. Houghton, "Policy of the United States and
Other Nations with Respect to the Recognition of the Soviet
Government, 1917-1929." International Conciliation , No. 247
(February, 1929), p. 14.""
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to
^
ne Foreign Relations of the United States . 1920 (Wash-
ington :"" Government Printing Office, 1936), III, pp. 466-468.
16Ibid., p. 467.
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Department of State announced recognition for the three
Baltic countries effective on the morning of July 28,
171922* A prime consideration in delaying recognition had
been the fear of encouraging "Japanese expansionist ambi-
18
tions in the Far East." The United States reaffirmed its
principle of not disturbing Russian territory but now simply
removed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the status of
being considered Russian soil*
The United States has consistently maintained that
the disturbed condition of Russian affairs may not be
made the occasion for the alienation of Russian terri-
tory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed
by the recognition at this time of the Governments of
Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania which have been set up
and maintained by an indigenous population. 19
The recognition of the Soviet union by the United
States was urged by many within this country* Senator
William £• Borah of Idaho was especially outspoken, as were
several business groups* Recognition was generally urged on
two grounds: (1) that the Soviet Union fulfilled the de
facto requirements of stability; and (2) on the basis of
20
encouraging commercial relations* Secretary Hughes did
not accept these views* On May 21, 1923, he received a
873*
17Ibid., p. 873*
18*qThe New York Times , January 28, 1921, 3:6.
19
U* S. State Department, Papers , 1922, 0£* cit • , II,
20^Perkins, 0£. cit * , p. 126*
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delegation representing the "Committee for Recognition of
Russia" of the Woman's International League for Peace and
Freedom* The committee contended that requirements for
recognition had largely been met by "recent" actions at
21Moscow* Hughes replied that the solution to Russia*
s
problem must come from inside Russia* There was little to
be gained economically by establishing closer relation with
the Soviet Union* People who had established relations had
fared little better than those who had not* Recognition
could not impose trade which depended upon economic factors*
The Russians had not yet supplied "what is essential" to
improve their own lot* Hughes stated that he did "recognise
fully the distinction between matters exclusively of eco-
nomic import, and the matter of diplomatic relations*
"
• • • the fundamental question in the recognition
of a government is whether it shows ability and a
disposition to discharge international obligations*
Stability, of course, is important; stability is
essential* Some speak as though stability was all
that was necessary* What would avail mere stability
if it were stability in the prosecution of a policy
of repudiation and confiscation? In the case of
Russia we have a very easy test of a matter of funda-
mental importance, and that is of good faith in the
discharge of international obligations* • • •
Here is a simple test* We have in this case no
need to speculate, as of what avail are assurances
21Schuman, op * clt *. p* 230*
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when we find properties taken, without compensation
or restoration* . • .'2
In addition, Hughes reminded the group of the fact that the
Communists encourage world revolution and that this meant
America as well as Europe* What he desired to see. declared
23
Hughes, was "evidence of the abandonment of that policy* w
It is evident from Hughes's pronouncement on March 21
that he was stressing principle but that it was not pre~
clsely the same principle of Woodrow Wilson* Wilson by-
passed traditional de facto standards to stress the methods
by which a government secured supremacy and the methods of
rule—^whether civilised or barbaric* International obliga-
tion was first a matter of willingness to live up to accepted
standards of moral conduct and constitutionality* Hughes
also bypassed traditional de facto requirements* Mere 'sta-
bility" was not all* A government must be willing to meet
its international obligations and these obligations were
24
synonymous with "American rights and claims *" This meant
that the Soviet Government must give up "its policies of
repudiation, confiscation, and encouragement of world
22
* United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States i 192 3 ( Wash-
ington: Government Printing d^flce, 1948), il , ">55-758
•
2 3Ibid *
24Cole, o£. clt *. p. 77.
Am
> 'u-.«*--' m mm
47
revolution*" To forge ahead economically or otherwise,
25
Russia must abandon Communism* Hughes had not dropped
WiXsonian principles $ he merely put them on a more pragmatic
basis of self-interest.
This approach of Hughes *s became more clear in July,
1923, in an exchange of letters with the President of the
American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers* As a labor
leader, Gompers opposed recognition of the Soviet Union* On
July 9, 1923, he wrote to Hughes that he was increasingly
disturbed by "the statement that economic conditions in
Russia are improving, that the Soviet authority is proving
stable • • • and that the American Government « • • should
extend recognition to the Soviets*" Gompers added that he
regarded it a "vital principle" that the essence of the
recognition problem was that the rulers of Russia are a
tyrannical minority imposing themselves on a reluctant
26people*"
Hughes, however, did not agree in his reply on July
19, 1923* He believed that such was not necessarily so in
view of past precedent* The Department of state must regard
the situation "in somewhat less general terms ." Although
25Schuman, op * clt * t p* 231*
26
U*S* Department of State, Papers . 1923 , IX, op * clt *
,
758-759*
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Jefferson had emphasised the "will of the nation," this
must be put in perspective*
It must be borne in mind, however, that while this
Government has laid stress upon the value of expressed
popular approval in determining whether a new govern-
ment should be recognised, it has never insisted that
the will of the people of a foreign State may not be
manifested by long continued acquiescence in a regime
actually functioning as a government.
Recognition is an invitation to intercourse. It
is accompanied on the part of the new government by
the clearly implied or express promise to fulfill
the obligation of Intercourse. ... In the case of
the existing regime in Russia, there has not only
been the tyrannical procedure to which you refer,
and which has causea the question of the submission
or acquiescence of the Russian people to remain an
open one, but also a repudiation of the obligations
inherent in international Intercourse and a defiance
of the principles upon which alone it can be conducted.
• •••••«*»•..••*•••••*•*••
The obligations of Russia to the taxpayers of the
Unit d States remain repudiated. 27
The foregoing statements are self-explanatory and
serve to point up the consistent pattern of Hughes *s ap-
proach to recogntion. There appears little doubt that the
views of Presidents Harding and Coolidge accorded much with
the views of Hughes. Doth, unlike Wilson, "accepted rather
28
than dictated the policies of the Secretary of State."
Harding, in a last address not delivered because of illness,
stated s
2 7Ibid ., pp. 760-764* 8Schuman, 0£. cit., p. 233.
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The problem of Russian recognition is complicated
by a fundamental difficulty, because of a government
regime there whose very existence is predicated upon
a policy of confiscation and repudiation*
• • « I prefer to safeguard our interests and hold
unsullied the seemingly proven principles under which
human rights and property rights are blended in the
supreme inspiration to human endeavor, 29
The death of President Harding in San Francisco on
August 2, 1923, brought Calvin Coolidge, a man no less
conservative and heedful of property rights , to the Presi-
dency* On December 6, 1923, President Coolldge listed, in a
message to Congress, the requirements for any reconsidera-
tion of America's Russian policy*
Whenever there appears any disposition to compen-
sate our cltisens who were despoiled, and to recognize
that debt contracted with our Government, not by the
Tsar, but by the newly formed Republic of Russia,
whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institu-
tions is abated; whenever there appear works meet
for repentance; our country ought to be the first to
go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia* We
have every desire to help and no desire to injure*
We hope the time is near at hand when we can act* 30
Evidently encouraged by this statement, the Soviet
Foreign Commissar Chlcherin telegraphed to President
29*
*The New York Times , August 1, 1923, 2:5*
30United States Congress, Congressional Record ,
Vol. 65, p* 451, December 20, 1923, cited by N. D. Houghton,
"Policy of the United States and other Nations With Respect
to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet Government, 1917-
1929." International Conciliation . No* 247 (February, 1929),
p. 21*
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Coolidge on December 16, 1923, to express the willingness of
the Soviet Government "to enter into negotiation with Ameri-
can government and to remove all misunderstandings and dif-
ferences between the two countries • " Chlcherin stated that
the Soviets were 'fully prepared to negotiate" on the "ques-
tion of claims mentioned in your message" on "assumption
31
that principle [sic 3 reciprocity recognized all around."
The reply of Secretary Hughes on December 18, 1923,
was so direct and brutually frank that it worked effectively
to discourage for some years any subsequent moves to mend
relations between the two nations* Hughes stated:
There would seem to be at this time no reason for
negotiations* The American Government, as the Presi-
dent said in his message to the Congress, is not
proposing to barter away its principles* If the
Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confis-
cate property of American citizens or make effective
compensation, they can do so. If the uthori-
tles are ready to repeal their decree repudiating
Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately
recognise them, they can do so* • • • Most serious is
the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions
of this country* This Government can enter into no
negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow
are abandoned* 32
The state of relations which existed at the time of
Hughes's reply to Chlcherin in 1923 was destined to continue
for ten years until 1933, when the Democratic Administration
31U*S* Department of state, Papers . 1923 , II, op * cit *«
p. 787.
32Ibid., p. 788.
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of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized the Soviet
Union after an interval of sixteen years. Meanwhile the
other major powers of the world had recognized the Soviet
Union during the years 1924 and 1925.
The stand of Hughes on nonrecognition of the Soviet
Union has been sufficiently documented. Viewed in the con-
text of his times, he took what appeared to be a very
logical position. Hughes, unlike Wilson, stressed the
material interests of American citizens. Like Wilson,
Hughes was willing to bypass the traditional requirements of
de facto recognition. Hughes was unwilling to stand pri-
marily on the principle of moral repugnance and lack of
freely expressed people's will, however. He would not dis-
card these views but insisted upon placing emphasis upon the
unorthodox economic policies of the Bolsheviks. Hughes
realized the difficulty in condemning the Communists on the
basis of being plain "no good."
It is possible that the Republicans would have recon-
sidered their policy toward the Soviet Union "had it not
been for the Communist tenets of confiscation of property,
33
repudiation of debts, and world revolution." This is
doubtful, however, in view of the anti-Communist mood of the
33Robert Paul Browder, Origins of SovletWVmerican
Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953),
p. 18.
... . . - -
52
American people, a rising nationalist emotion which empha-
sized such stands as a demand for repayment to the United
States of war debts from Allies as well as from foes and the
Soviet Union, a Congress bent upon asserting its leadership
,
and a man of the narrow legal views of Hughes himself*
Hughes felt strongly an obligation to protect American in-
terests* To him, such interests were fully as important, if
not more so, than any moral debate over the legitimacy and
civilized intent of the Soviet regime*

CHAPTER V
THE D0KE5TXC SCENE
Any examination of the recognition policy of the
United States towards Soviet Russia from 1917 through 1923
would be woefully incomplete, if not misleading, were not
the impact and influences of the domestic scene to be In-
cluded. The inward tug of domestic politics served to
undercut the importance of international affairs • This
trend became very evident during the last years in office of
Woodrow Wilson during which he waged his political battle
for League of Nations membership for the United States* It
became well established with successive Republic Administra-
tions during the 1920* s. However, this isolationist tendency
was not, by any means, the whole story # There was also
waged a propaganda battle which reached the very corners of
the nation and which was more often characterized by a near
hysterical crescendo of anti-Communist hatred than by any
more rational considerations*
1
The Great Red Scare
In retrospect, it can be seen that the wave of emo-
tional bias which sprang up in the United States following
^•See Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran (Prince-
tons Princeton University Press, 1944 J , !Eaptaj T
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the success of the Bolshevik Revolution 1917 was but one of
several emotional high tides which have come and gone since
the inception of the United States* There have been con-
flicts between warlike fervor and a dedication to peaceful
solutions of difficulties, between expansionism and isola-
tionism, between liberalism and conservatism*
This does not mean, of course, that much of the
antipathy toward the Bolsheviks which sprang up In the
United States did not have a good basis in fact* The an-
tagonistic political philosophies and even more antagonistic
modes of expression of the new Bolshevik Government have al-
ready been mentioned* Terror, with its accompanying dis-
regard for human life, was an instrument of the Bolsheviks
in their war against counter-revolutionaries* The success
of the dictatorship of the proletariat was furthered by mass
executions and atrocities*
But if the shortcomings of the Bolsheviks were a
damaging indictment of their cause, it must also be admitted
that a truly objective view of the new Soviet Government by
the West was not forthcoming* The account which emerged was
one in which one side only received a consistent hearing*
Much of the same opprobrium which had attached to the Ger-
2
mans quickly fell to the Bolsheviks* The tendency to
Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward
Russia Since 1917 (New York* International Publishers,
1925), pTTgi"
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discredit the enemy, to accept at face value every charge
made against him, to equate one side with the moral right-
eousness and the other with savagery and lust for power—
became a part of the approach between the Allies and Bol-
shevik Russia*
This link between the Bolsheviks and the Germans was
confirmed in the minds of many by the Slsson Documents which
were released by the united States Committee on Public In-
formation in the middle of September, 1918* Sdgar G. Slsson,
special representative in Russia of the United States Com-
mittee on Public Information, had compiled a series of docu-
ments which purported that the Bolshevik leaders were in the
pay of Germany, The November Revolution was a product of
German Imperial Staff planning and financed with German
funds while the entire Bolshevik Government was a device for
betraying the Russian people.
Although these documents were of dubious nature and
suspect from the beginning, the newspaper coverage of them,
in addition to the official nature of their release, caused
them to be widely accepted by the people of the United States*
Despite the fact that the documents were ultimately dis-
credited, they had gone far to create an atmosphere in which
The New York Times , September 16, 1918, 11:1, cited
by P. L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917
(New York: International Publishers, 1^28), pp. 152-153.
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any charge of corruption and cruelty against the Bolsheviks
4
would be readily accepted.
The Sisson Documents complemented the feeling of
resentment which had arisen in the United States over the
virtual surrender of the Bolsheviks to the Germans which was
signified by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk* To the United
States, as indeed to the Allies in general, the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk was viewed as a disaster of the first magni-
tude. Not only had the Russians violated a treaty agreement
not to make a separate peace, but they had allegedly caused
the loss of many thousands of Allied lives by such action,
not to mention the billions of dollars of additional expen-
diture needed to defeat Germany*
This, of course, was true, as far as it went* It did
not take into consideration the inability of Russia to par-
ticipate further in any war against Germany. Be this as it
may, there was a general tendency among the Allies to lay
the blame for much of their hardship upon the heads of the
5Bolsheviks who had betrayed them to Germany* The end of
the war, consequently, did not lead to a lessening of anti-
Bolshevik feeling among the Allies* With every fresh Soviet
excess, there was a fresh torrent of condemnation.
4
Dulles, 0£. cit., p. 154*
5Schuman, op . cit., p. 153,
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Much of the anti-Bolshevik propaganda was inspired by
governmental agencies to justify Allied action and to fur-
6
ther Allied interests, such as the intervention efforts.
There was, however, one aspect in which the Russian situation
differed significantly from that of Germany previously.
Propaganda of the war between the Allies and the Central
Powers was largely between governments. The chief contents
of anti-Bolshevik propaganda were supplied to a large degree
lay private and unofficial sources. These included the
numerous groups of Russian emigres, dispossessed noblemen,
"expropriated bourgeoisie," and exiled intellectuals and
political leaders who had fled their native Russia in the
wake of the March and November Revolutions. These groups,
who had lost everything, hated those who had dispossessed
them* and they did all within their power to remedy the
situation so that they could return to their native land.
They found a sympathetic ear in much of the world outside
Russia and kept up a persistent bombardment of words—most
of which bore little relation to reality.
The influence of these exiles and their propaganda
was far out of proportion to their numbers or importance and
lingered on long after their cause was patently hopeless to
'Dulles, 0£. cit. , pp* 154-155.
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7
all* Mr. Boris BaJehraetev, the previously-mentioned Ambas-
sador from the Provisional Government to the United States,
became a natural mouthpiece for many of these groups since
he was still officially in the diplomatic chain of corres-
pondence! although he did not represent any effective
government* Other groups found sympathetic organisations
both in the United States and abroad to take up their cause*
Direct appeals were made to the American public by
these groups* Attention and sympathy, as well as financial
assistance, were obtained in this way for military ventures
against the Bolsheviks such as those headed by General
Oenikin and Admiral Kolchak* Congressional investigations
and records were filled with the words of these groups, who
were very available for any anti-Bolshevik investigation*
It was, in fact, difficult for anyone sympathetic to the
Communist cause to make himself heard. Thus, official Con-
gressional reports were filled with the same bids for atten-
8tlon which characterized newspaper accounts of the period*
The immediate aim of most of these groups was to in-
crease Allied intervention plus greater material assistance
7Schuman, op * clt ,, p* 151.
8See United States Congress, Senate, Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 66&
Congress, 2d Session, pursuant to Senate Resolution 263,
Russian Propaganda Hearings (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office , 1§20 )
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to organized anti-Bolshevik resistance organizations inside
Russia* Considerable pressure was applied in an attempt to
9
gain recognition for the Omsk Government* Typical of these
appeals was one made by a group of New Yorkers in April of
1919 to 'all Americans who are not Bolsheviks, anarchists,
I.w.w.'s, Non-Partisan Leaguers, nor Socialists" in an
effort to enlist aid for Kolchak and Denikin:
Bolshevism is the assault of greed, ignorance and
brute force upon everything that Americans have
learned to hold most sacred* It destroys liberty,
property rights, law, order, marriage, the home and
education* It is the murderer of peace, enlightenment
and progress* Its loot enriches a few black-hearted
and red-handed leaders and beggars everybody else* 10
American newspapers of the period were somewhat less
than objective in their reporting of the Russian situation*
They were prone to follow Washington's lead and to publish
almost any news or rumor about the Bolsheviks without verifi-
cation* The story of the "nationalization of women" was an
example* This fantastic and shocking story had its beginnings
in a melange of distorted facts in April, 1918, which were
primarily based upon sketchy reporting of Soviet legislation
on divorce, marriage, family, and the like. Prom these grew
a burgeoning tale of the "nationalizing" of all Soviet women
for the purposes of the Soviet State* Despite the fact that
9Schuman, op * cit
• , p. 157*
1 The New York Times , April 27, 1919; 7:1.
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the United States Department of State denied the rumor in
February of 1919, the story was widely carried in newspapers
and over radio media throughout the world* Subsequent
retractions and denials did little to erase the perverted
view of the Soviet State which was confirmed in the minds of
many of the public by such an abstraction*
A study of American newspaper headlines, particularly
in the year 1919, gives a good perspective of the sensa-
tionalism attached to much of the reporting about the Soviet
12Government* There are sensational headlines of massacre
and evil deeds perpetrated by the Bolsheviks* Reporters of
the period seem to have vied with one another in searching
for new adjectives to describe the latest actions of the
Bolsheviks* The public seems to have conveniently forgotten
from day to day that the predicted disasters and reported
tragedies had a way of evaporating only to be replaced by
more reports*
There was, of course, some substance to the charges
of massacre, of destruction of property, of attacks upon
religion, and other evil deeds, but, in general, the facts
were distorted out of any close semblance to reality* The
Dulles, op* cit * . p* 158*
12See The New York Times headlines for the month of
June, 1919, as a typical example*
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cruelest hoax was that the average citizen was continually
informed that the end was In sight—that the fall of the
Bolshevik Government was imminent* Thus, with a few excep-
tions "the daily newspapers throughout 1919 and much of 1920
announced almost every week,
. « • that the Soviet Govern-
ment had collapsed or was collapsing . « • *" This was in
part a carryover from the early period of Bolshevism when
the American and Allied Governments had optimistically based
their Russian policy upon the hope of the early demise of
the Bolshevik regime*
In view of the security fears evidenced by the anti-
Communist campaigns waged in the United States, it was
natural that the organizational activities of Socialists or
any Left-wing groups within the United States would be
watched closely. In point of fact, Communist propaganda had
small success* But the organization of an American Commu-
nist Party in September of 1919 was viewed as an ominous
14fact. The party, which grew out of a split in the Social-
ist Party of the United States, became the Communist Labor
Party led by John Reed* Driven underground for a time, it
emerged in 1921 as the Workers Party of America. 15
Schuraan, agu cifc*
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1 Max Beloff , The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia
(London: Oxford University Press , 1947 ) , I, 11^-118.
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Despite the fact that Communism in America remained
primarily a creed of a small part of the intelligentsia, the
American Communist Party became the focus of anti-Communist
efforts. The year 1919 was marked by growing industrial
strife in the United States, and the Communists were accused
16
of fomenting the trouble. In the latter part of 1919 and
climaxing in mass raids upon Communist headquarters through-
out the country on New Year's Day, 1920, thousands of men
and women suspected of Communist sympathies were rounded up*
Most were released, but sills Island was crowded. "On
December 22, 1919, the transport Buford, popularly known as
the 'Soviet Ark,' sailed back from New York for Russia with
17
some 249 Reds 'to be taken back to where they came from."*
The roundup continued throughout 1920 and came to be
18known as "The Deportations Delirium of 1920." One who was
caught up in the net as an enemy alien who sought to over-
throw by force the Government of the United States was
Ludwig C. A. K. Martens. Martens, a German subject who had
been born in Russia, had on March 19, 1919, sent to the
United States Department of State a set of credentials as
the representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign
——-^ ll «l l r .1 m I.,. . . , . | I, | | i i in |
16Ibld .
17Ibid., pp. 163-164.
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19
Affairs In the United States. The United States refused
to recognize Martens, but he distributed Soviet literature
while attempting to establish trade contacts. In 1920, the
Labor Department indicted Martens as an undesirable alien to
be deported* Martens, who had increasingly become the
target of American anti-Communist propaganda, left Hew York
on January 22, 1921, on the Liner Stockholm , which had come
to be called the "second Soviet Ark-' 1 because of the seventy-
five deportees it carried*
As has been previously mentioned, Secretary Colby's
note to the Italian Ambassador on August 10, 1920, marked
the "crystallisation" of Wilson *s policy toward Soviet
21Russia." The year 1920 also marked the high point of anti-
Communist agitation in the United States. From that time on,
the hysterical tone which had come to characterise the ap-
proach of the United States toward the Soviet Union abated.
There would be less emotion and perhaps more reason in the
official and unofficial attitudes toward the Soviets. The
underlying base of hostility was still there, however, and
continued to affect relationships throughout the whole of
the 1920 's.
19Ibid .. p. 186.
20
The New York Times , January 22, 1921, 1:7.
Dulles, op . cit., p. 168.
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The Muffled Twenties
The period of the 1920 's has assumed a special niche
in American history* It is a part of the body of American
lore that the decade of the 1920 *s is referred to as the
"Roaring Twenties." It is hailed somewhat nostalgically as
a boisterous, carefree period when the world was America*
s
oyster* This may be, but while we roared on the domestic
scene, our efforts in international diplomacy echoed like a
dull thud*
There was no one really willing to pick up Wilson's
tarnished mantle and carry out his principles* The public
indeed appeared disillusioned with diplomats and diplomacy*
The men and the mood of the times combined to dictate the
22
approach which Kennan has termed "legalistic-moralistic*"
Arnold Toynbee has characterised the mood of the time:
The non-recognition of the Soviet Government had
been one of the political luxuries in which the United
States had felt itself free to indulge during the
period of peculiar local prosperity in North America
which may be said to have begun on the morrow of the
Armistice of the lltt November, 1918, and to have ended
with the break on Wall Street in the autumn of 1929
on the economic plane, and on the political plane with
the Japanese outbreak in Manchuria in the autumn of
1931* During those years of prosperity the Americans
had felt no need of Russia* s good will, either in
politics or in trade, while they had resented the
existence of the Communist regime, in the former domain
of the Russian Czardora, as an incarnate criticism—
22George ?* Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950
(New York: The New American Library , 1952 ) , p. 8i
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outrageously Insolent and insufferably inept—of an
established system of society whose virtue was demon-
strated, in the American opinion of the day, by the
dazzling success of its local incarnation in the
united states*
This passionate and almost personal antagonism to
the Soviet Government was prevalent, during the years
of prosperity in the united States, in the American-
born upper stratum of the American working class as
well as among the bourgeois business men, small and
great; and any sympathy towards Soviet Russia which
was manifested by the American proletariat or intel-
ligentsia was branded as "un-American" and subversive
by the makers of orthodox American public opinion* 23
Toynbee is somewhat harsh* He fails to give proper
importance to a growing United States-Soviet trade which
reached a high point in 1930-1931* Nevertheless, he has
well summarized the times* The twenties were somewhat an
island unto themselves, and the actors well fitted the scene
<
Neither Presidents Harding nor Coolidge were well fitted to
assume the leadership in the area of foreign affairs*
Harding was a man of "mediocre" intellect and "Coolidge was
congenitally cautious, incapable of powerful or effective
leadership.-24 Charles Svans Hughes ana his successor,
Prank B. Kellogg, were given free rein as Secretaries of
State under Chief Executives who were not primarily
23Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs -
1933 (London: Oxford UhiversityTress , 1934), p. 532*
24Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and
American Public Opinion," The Diplomats 1919-1933 . edited
by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (toew York: """Atheneum,
1963), I, 285.
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concerned with international Issues and were certainly not
noted for energy* The pattern set by Hughes and confirmed
by Kellogg, at least as far as the recognition of Russia was
involved, became so ingrained that it persisted through the
term in office of Herbert Hoover and his Secretary of State
Henry L* Stimson* Stimson may have had ideas of his own,
but Herbert Hoover was a powerful personality in his own
right and left no doubt about his distaste for the Soviet
Government.
The prosperity of the united States and the forces
stemming from that prosperity thus served to concentrate
"American attention upon domestic rather than foreign af-
25fairs*" The desire of the American people to return to
what Warren G. Harding called "normalcy" automatically
created an antagonism toward the disturbing forces unleashed
by the Soviets* It can be seen that throughout the 1920 *s
the relationship between the United States and Soviet Russia
reflected as much as anything else "the interaction of eco~
nomic and social developments" within the two nations*
This does not mean that the subject of recognition ceased to
exist during the 1920 • s* But there was certainly no over-
riding sense of urgency, as there had been previously in
25Ibid.
26
Dulles, o£. cit.
, p. 180*
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relation with Soviet Russia* Recognition became a favorite
topic along with jazz, Harding Administration scandals, pro-
hibition, and Babe Ruth* Real knowledge about the Soviet
union remained vague and contradictory. Any radical ac-
tivity or extreme liberalism was identified with Communism
and was opposed on the basis of not being in "the American
27Way* **
'
There were vigorous proponents of recognition just as
there were vigorous opponents* The minority in favor of
recognition stressed the advantages of resuming trade and
diplomatic relations with a government whose de facto
existence could not be challenged* The subversive aims of
the Communists were admitted but doubt expressed as to the
existence of any real danger to the United States* The
united States Senator from Idaho, William Borah, who became
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee upon the
death of Senator Lodge in 1924, believed that recognition of
Russia would not imply approval of Communism, but would
indicate "a determination to transact necessary international
29business with the only governmental authority in Russia*"
27Ibld *MMMMMi
28
N« 0* Houghton, "Policy of the United States and
Other Nations with Respect to the Recognition of the Russian
Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation
.
No* 247 (February, 1929), p* 27.
29Ibid.
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Borah* s views were supported by American commercial and in-
dustrial interests which cared not about political principles
but about Russia as a market for business and trade*
The opponents to recognition were often well organ-
ised and powerful* They included among others: the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, the Catholic Church, Patriotic
Societies, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution
and the American Legion, and the general American public*
The American Federation of Labor under the leadership of
Samuel Gompers was especially adamant in its opposition to
the Government of the Soviet Union—an understandable pos-
tur, in view of Soviet labor poiici.,. 30
Still, all in all, there was no one organisation or
issue which determined the overall policy of nonrecognition,
but rather the "whole complex of Soviet acts," which the
American public dealt with under the name of "Communism* l
popular vote at any time during the 1920 *s would probably
have returned a majority for the course of the State Depart-
ment* The people were in no mood to allow the dangerous
liberal philosophy of Communism to interrupt their prosper-
ous and conservative capitalist way of life*
An interesting episode in the United States-Soviet
30Robert taul Browder, Origins of Soviet-Amerlean
Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 19
V
p. 22.
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relationship during this period was the famine relief under-
taken by Herbert Hoover's American Relief Administration in
the Soviet Union from September, 1921, when the actual
31
assistance began, to its completion in July, 1923.
On July 13, 1921, Doctor Fridtjof Nansen, the world
famous Norwegian statesman and Arctic explorer, received a
copy of a telegram sent by Maxim Gorky to the Archbishop of
Canterbury and the Bishop of New York asking for famine
32
assistance. Soviet Russia had hemn stricken by a famine
of appalling proportions and needed immediate assistance.
Hansen forwarded the letter through the United States Minis-
33ter in Norway to Secretary of State Hughes. Herbert
Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, proposed aid through the
American Relief Administration which he headed. The Ameri-
can Government was in favor, but insisted that the entire
operation be carried on by the A.R.A. and that the United
States Government not be officially involved.
The non-involvement of the United States Government
was, of course, a diplomatic nicety not a reality. It
31Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (New
York: Random House, Inc., 1^60)
, P.T28'.
32United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the united States - 192T
Washington J Government "Printing Office, 1936 ) , II, 804-
805.
33Ibld .« p. 804.
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preserved the fiction of nonrecognition while allowing the
United States to act. On August 20, 1921, after the Soviet
Government had raet certain specifications laid down by
Secretary Hoover, the agreement setting up the operation was
signed by Maxim Litvinov for the Soviet Union and by Walter
34
Brown for the American Relief Administration* One of the
conditions for the cooperation of the American Relief Admin-
istration had been the release of all American prisoners
detained in Russia* This accomplished in one step what all
previous negotiations had failed to do in this line* The
agreement itself consisted of some twenty-seven articles*
Article twenty-five read as follows:
That its personnel [A*R*A«] in Russia will confine
themselves strictly to the ministration of relief and
will engage in no political activity or commercial
activity whatever* 35
The operation lasted for two years and proved fully
as successful as Herbert Hoover's previous ministrations of
American aid following World War I* Although the Russians
had hoped that the operation would mean the furthering of
relations between the two nations, they were disappointed*
The agreement was made entirely with the American Relief
Administration and was non-political in that it did not
36
represent a departure from previous American policy* The
^Ibid *. pp* 810-818. 35Ibid *, p. 817.
36
The New York Times . August 21, 1921, 1«7.
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situation had not been entirely unofficial since the Ameri-
can Congress had had to vote to supply the American Relief
Administration with the necessary supplies* The Senate had
debated the issue but finally voted the requested relief
37
supplies without acting on the recognition question*
The issues of the domestic scene were very much re-
flected in the approach of Secretary Hughes to the problem
of Soviet recognition* The pragmatic, legalistic approach
of Hughes was calculated to fit the political mood of the
people and reflected the confidence of the American public
in the 1920 *s to "go it alone." Woodrow Wilson's stand on
recognition, as expressed in Colby's letter of August 20,
1920, had been based upon principle* Such a stand may well
have been justified, but it did not lend Itself to the
prevalent mood of the 1920 's* The universal fear and hatred
of Bolshevism which boiled over during Wilson's Administration
subsided in the face of a rising tide of Isolationism and
domestic egocentrism which was powerfully supported by popu-
lar feeling and ancient tradition*
Anti-Bolshevik antipathy gradually subsided from its
violent peaks of 1919 and 1920, but it served effectively to
mass public support behind the Republican Administration
policy of Soviet nonrecognition* The pragmatic policy of
37Schuman, op * cit
• , p. 205*
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Hughes was consonant with the prosperous, self-satisfied
materialistic tenor of the American domestic scene* It
would not be until the need for trade became more acute that
a real attack on Soviet nonrecognltion would be mounted.
Communism in the United States had assumed by 1923
much the same character it has maintained to this day—that
of a "whipping-boy" to be used to justify any sort of
"America first" conduct. The attitude of the American
Government toward the question of famine relief for the
Soviet Union was typical of the period. The United States
felt that it had demonstrated its regard for the Russian
people through the actions of Hoover » s American Relief
Administration. Whatever moral obligation there was had
also been fulfilled. Overall, it is understandable that the
United States Department of State felt far from being on the
defensive over its position on Russian recognition during
the 1920 • s.
I
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CHAPTER VI
THE DEBT QUESTION
The Soviet Government made official its repudiation
of past debts when it issued a decree on January 21, 1918,
which canceled obligations owed to foreign governments and
to foreign nationals*
1* All national loans concluded by the govern-
ments of Russian landowners and Russian Bourgeoisie
enumerated in specially published lists are annulled
[annihilated] from December 1, 1917. The December
coupons of these loans are not subject to payment*
2* In the same manner are annulled all guarantees
given by the said governments on loans for different
undertakings and institutions*
3* Unconditionally and without exception, all
foreign loans are annulled*
*
The repudiation of past debts by the new Bolshevik
Government of Russia was understood by the Allied Government
for exactly what it was-—one in a series of blows against
established Bourgeois order* The Allies refused to accept
this edict, just as they refused to accept other Bolshevik
pronouncements, in the expectation of the early collapse of
the new regime*
For the United States, the problem of debt settlement
i
Leo Pasvolsky and Harold G* Moulton, Russian Debts
and Russian Reconstruction (New Yorki The McGraw-ttiil Book
Company, 1924), pp. 197-198
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was to develop ramifications little suspected in 1917* Be-
cause of the Soviet stand on debt repudiation, the question
of the Soviet debt to the United States did not enter into
the negotiations for the settlement of the inter-Allied war
debts. Yet, the position which the United States adopted in
the matter of debt repayments by its allies inevitably af-
fected the position on the Russian debt matter also. In
this respect, the United States had left very little room
for maneuver, even if it had so desired. Its position be-
came, in effect, locked in.
For the first time in its existence as a nation, the
United States found itself transformed into a major creditor
nation at the conclusion of World War I. During the war and
immediately after, some twenty nations had borrowed approxi-
mately $10,318,000,000 from the United States. Of this
amount, Great Britain and France owed the lion* 8 share. In
fact, the borrowings of Great Britain, France, and Italy
accounted for about 90 per cent of the total sum owed to the
United States.
The total Russian war and pre-war debt approximated
some six billions of dollars. The major share of this
2Charles Merz, "To Revise Or Not To Revise: The
Debts Issue," International :onclliatlon . No, 287 (February,
1933), p. 9.
Pasvolsky and Moulton, op . cit
• , pp. 180-181.
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amount was owed to Great Britain and France* There was no
previous Russian debt owed to the United States by Russia.
In 19X7,
the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of
the President, made certain loans to the Provisional
Government of Russia for the purpose of more effec-
tually providing for the national security and
defense and prosecuting the war. The net amount of
the loans so made . . .
4
was $187,729,750* Ho further loans were made to the
Treasury of the Russian Government after November, 1917* In
addition, debts outstanding to the United States consisted
of bond issues floated by the Imperial Russian Government
on the American market and claims resulting from confisca-
tion and nationalisation of property by the Bolsheviks* The
total has been variously estimated but did approximate some
$700, 000, 000. 5
There appears to be little doubt that the $10.3 bil-
lion dollars advanced by the United States to friendly
governments throughout and immediately following the war
period had been regarded as loans by both lender and re-
ceivers. Some few had spoken up to say that the money should
4United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States - ljjffiT
Washington: Government Printing Office, isii7), II, 880.
s
N. 0. Houghton, "Policy of the united States and
Other Nations With Respect to the Recognition of the Russian
Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation .
No. 247 (February, 1929), pp* 26-21*
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be regarded as America's contribution to the war effort and
that Europe was in no position to repay such sums* These
voices were disregarded, however* Prom the first, President
Wilson refused to consider cancellation of the debts or to
6discuss them at the Paris Peace Conference*
In taking his stand, Wilson was but reflecting public
opinion* In the wake of nationalism which swept the United
States, American people "saw only that they had played a
decisive part in the winning of the war • • • and that the
7United states had little to show" for its part* Any sug-
gestion to forgive the debts aroused the immediate antipathy
of the American people* Thus, when Great Britain suggested
twice in 1920 that war debts be generally canceled, it was
informed that the American people would sanction no cancel-
8lation, either in whole or in part*
The chief problem among the Allies over the debt
problem became that of reparations* The European debtor
B* H. Williams, The Sconomlc Foreign Policy of the
United States (New York f~""The McGraw-Hill SoolT" ompany,""
i$29i, p. 17*
7Gordon A* Craig and Felix Gilbert teds.), The
Diplomats 1919-1939 (New York: Atheneum, 1963), iT^Ol,
citing Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American
Public Opinion*"
°Leo Pasvolsky and H. G* Moulton, War Debts and World
Prosperity (Washington; Brookings Institute , 1932 ) , pp. 52-
70, cited by Julius w. Pratt, A History of U.S* Foreign
Policy (New York: Prentice-HaTl , 1950), p."~5lT0.
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governments insisted that debt repayment must hinge upon the
collection of reparation from Germany* The United states
9
refused to consider the two as being related* At the Paris
Peace Conference, a Reparation Commission was set up to
report by Kay, 1921, its findings*
The reparations figure set by the Commission in May
of 1921 was one hundred and thirty-two billion marks, or
approximately thirty-three billion dollars. Germany, of
course, could not keep up payments and defaulted within
fifteen months—setting off a chain reaction which ended in
general defaulting on debt payments by the >pean coun-
tries and the occupation by the French and Belgium armies of
11
the Ruhr in January, 1923*
For the united States, the debt issue was never hap-
pily settled. The Republican Administration of President
Harding was just as determined as had been the preceding
Democratic Administration to collect the debts owed to the
United States and was just as unsuccessful* By an act of
February 9, 1922, Congress created the World War Foreign
Debt Commission which was authorised to negotiate settlement
upon the basis that "no portion of any debt might be
9Julius w* Pratt, A History of U.S. Foreign Policy
(Mew Yorka Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 562.
10Ibid. 1XIbid*
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cancelled." Between May of 1923 and Hay of 1926, agreements
were made with thirteen countries at varying interest rates-
based on a hypothetical ability to pay. The last agreement
12
was made with Austria in 1930.
These efforts came to no avail, however, as nations
continued to default. Germany was never able to carry the
load of reparations. Thus, a succession of plans-—the Dawes
Plan in September of 1924 and the Young Plan in January of
1930 came to nothing. The Hoover Moratorium marked the
13
practical end of all debt payment on June 20, 1931.
Against such a background, the rigid American atti-
tude toward the Soviet repudiation of debts as well as other
international responsibilities can be more fully understood.
The United States position in demanding that the Soviet
Government honor its obligations was consistent with offi-
cial policy which was applied to friend and foe alike.
What did the Soviets want as they bargained with the
Western nations in 1921? They obviously were looking for
credit* They desperately needed capital to get their
economy moving. Second, they wanted trade in order to
utilise the wealth of Russian raw materials to gain badly-
needed imports. Finally, they were looking for diplomatic
recognition which they hoped would ease their position in
1 2Ibid . , p. 561. 13Ibld .. p. 569.
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14
the world And gain prestige for the Communist cause. They
were willing to give concessions to gain these ends, as was
so often announced to the world, but they were not willing
to sacrifice the revolution which they had brought about.
The Soviet willingness to bargain was evidenced by an
almost eager acceptance of any opportunity to meet with
Allied representatives. Wilson's invitation to all "'organ-
ised" groups to meet at Prinkipo was quickly accepted by the
15
Bolsheviks. Chicherin's acceptance telegram indicated a
desire to negotiate, but was subtly insolent in its tone.
In view of the special importance which not only
the press, but also the representatives of the Entente
Governments, attach in their oft-repeated statements
to the question of loans, the Soviet Government de-
clares itself, in the first place, willing to meet
the demands of the Entente Powers on this point. It
does not refuse [to recognize its financial obliga-
tions to its creditors who are the subject of The
Entente Powers, leaving the precise formulation of the
manner in which this point is to be enforced to the
special Treaties, the elaboration of which is to be
one of the tasks of the proposed negotiations. • • . j 16
As previously has been mentioned, the Prinkipo meet-
ing never came about because other Russian groups refused to
meet with the Bolsheviks. They did not wish to see the
George F. Kennan, Russia and the West (New Yorks
The New American Library, 1962), p. 175
.
15United States Department of State , Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States , IS " , Sussj
(Washington : Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 31.
X6Ibld.. p. 40.
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Bolsheviks recognized, and they were somewhat dismayed at
the terms of Wilson* s invitation*
The next contact with the Soviet Government was by
the Bullitt Mission* Bullitt, who was impressed by the
stability of the Soviet Government, drew up on March 12,
1919, a document which was to s&rve as the basis for future
negotiations* The Soviet authorities expressed their will-
ingness to meet with the Allies and agreed upon certain
conditions* These included "mutual recognition by all govern-
ments on the territory of the old Russian empire; and the
acknowledgment by these states of their obligation to pay
17part of the Russian debt owed the Allies* • • ."
At the meeting during which the pact was drawn up,
Litvinov proposed to Bullitt a plan by which the United
States would take over all Allied claims against Russia and
to cancel in return a corresponding part of Allied debts to
18Washington* By this interesting arrangement, the Soviet
Government hoped to simplify its debts and perhaps to gain a
more preferred creditor* Bullitt's high hopes were dashed
when he found himself virtually ignored when he returned to
Paris and, thus, nothing came of any of his plans*
17Robert Paul Browder , Origins of Soviet-American
Diplomacy (Princeton! Princeton university Press , l££i }
,
p. 11*
18Ibid *. p. 12.
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If President Wilson had demanded full Soviet payment
of debts. Secretary of State Hughes of the Harding Adminis-
tration was even more adamant* Hughes lost no time in not
only demanding full satisfaction of Soviet responsibilities,
but also equated his demands with possible recognition*
Wilson had never demanded debt payment as a price of recog-
nition*
In early 1922, the United States was invited to par-
ticipate in an economic and financial conference to be
19
opened at Genoa on March 3, 1922* This proposed confer-
ence had an interesting background* Originally, it had been
scheduled to take up the problem of German reparations, but
French concern over security interests and suspicions of
British intentions led to the fall of the Brland Government*
Poincare, the new premier, wanted no one to interfere with
20his own solution for reparations* The Genoa Conference,
thus, became chiefly a Russian matter* On January 6, the
Supreme Council Meeting at Cannes called for an Economic and
21Financial Conference to meet on March 8 at Genoa, Italy*
19United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to fcfe Foreign Relations of the United States , 1922
"Washington i Government Printing Office, 1937), it, 387*
20Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (New
York: Random House, Inc*, 1960), p."""?31.
21Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward
Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928),
p. 217*
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The Soviet Union was invited and, at once, accepted* The
United States was invited, as previously mentioned, but
refused. Secretary of State Hughes, in replying to the
formal invitation of Ambassador Ricci of Italy, saldi
• • . it has been found impossible to escape the
conclusion that the proposed conference is not pri-
marily an economic conference, as questions appear
to have been scheduled for consideration without the
satisfactory determination of which the chief causes
of economic disturbance must continue to operate,
but is rather a conference of a political character
in which the Government of the United States could
not helpfully participate. 2*
This meant, of course, that the United States wanted
nothing to do with the Soviet Union. American interests
were upheld by the presence of the United States Ambassador
to Italy, Mr. R. W. Child, who attended the conference as an
unofficial observer.
At the Genoa Conference, Soviet statesmen had an
opportunity to meet face to face with the Western statesmen.
The results were not encouraging. On April 16, 1922, the
conference was thrown into an uproar by the signing of the
Treaty of Rapallo by Chicherin of the Soviet Union and
Walter Rathenau of Germany. By the Treaty of Rapallo, the
Soviet Union and Germany mutually renounced compensation for
war and civil damage inflicted by one state upon the
^J.S. Department of State, Papers « 1922 . op. cit,
I, 393.
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23
other. This buttressed Soviet resistance to Allied de-
mands made upon Soviet Russia in a document drawn up on
April 28.
The chief import of the document was that assistance
would be forthcoming for Russia "as soon as security in
Russia has been re-established for former owners and debts
are recognized* " The Russian Soviet Government must recog-
nise "all public debts and obligations, which have been con-
tracted for or guaranteed by the Imperial Russian Government
or the Russian Provisional Government or by the Soviet
Government towards foreign powers* " The Allies, meanwhile,
could not admit to any liability for claims brought by the
Soviet Government
for loss and damage suffered during the revolution in
Russia since the war* [Further, the Soviet Government
was] • • • to restore or compensate all foreign in-
terests for loss or damage caused to them when property
has been confiscated or withheld*24
The Soviet reply rejected Allied demands* The
Soviets claimed that they had come to Genoa with a "number
of schemes and proposals regarding the credits and loans
required by Russia in exchange for real guarantees" and con-
cession* This hope had been thwarted, however* The Soviet
23Fischer, 0£* clt . , p. 250*
24U.S* Department of State, Papers, 22, op * clt .,
II, 777-780.
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Government could not submit to political demands* Further,
the Soviets said:
Prom a legal point of view, Russia is therefore
in no way bound to pay debts contracted in the past,
to restore property or compensate its former owners,
or to pay indemnities for other losses occasioned to
foreign subjects* * * • nevertheless, in a spirit of
conciliation, and in the hope of reaching an agreement
with all the Powers, Russia has accepted the principle
contained in the third of the Conner Conditions, under
condition of reciprocity*
The war debts having been incurred for a specific
purpose, were automatically cancelled by the fact that
Russia, having retired from the war and having no
share in its advantages, could not be expected to
share its cost* With this exception, the Russian
Delegation has expressed its readiness to agree to
the payment of state debts, on condition that the
losses caused to Russia by intervention and blockade
are recognized* 25
In short, Chicherin declared his government's readi-
ness to accept past obligations, with the exception of war
debts, provided Soviet counterclaims for intervention and
blockade were recognized* Against claims of other govern-
ments against Russia totaling $1 3, 000, 000, 000, Chicherin
presented counterclaims of some $60,000,000,000* The Soviet
counterclaims could be scaled down if certain considerations
were received*
The Allied Governments were in no mood to consider
25Ibid., pp. 792-803.
26Schuman, op * cit.
,
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such Soviet demands* The Soviet Government was willing to
meet Allied demands only if the Allies would furnish the
necessary credits and grant reciprocity to Soviet counter-
claims. The Genoa Conference adjourned on May 19 with an
27
agreement to continue at the Hague on June 15, 1921.
The failure of the Genoa Conference seemed to confirm
the outlook of the American State Department on the futility
of attempting to deal with the Soviet Government. The pro-
posed Hague Conference was looked upon in the same light*
Until the Soviets changed their approach, negotiation was
fruitless* In refusing an invitation for American partici-
pation, Hughes stated:
This Government, however, is unable to conclude
that it can helpfully participate in the meeting at
the Hague as this would appear to be a continuance
under a different nomenclature of the Genoa Confer-
ence and destined to encounter the same difficul-
ties* . . .23
The Hague Conference was, indeed, a continuation of
Genoa* The study was broken down into three areas of debts,
private property, and credits* No accord could be reached
in any of these areas* The Soviet attitude was basically
the same as at Genoa—that Soviet concessions would be
forthcoming if credits were granted* Any compensation for
2 7Ibid *. p. 220.
U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1922 . op * cit
•
,
II, 808.
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nationalized property or pre-war debts was a "matter of ex-
pediency to secure a loan*" Further, no war debts would be
29
recognised. The Hague Conference closed on July 20, 1922,
without having accomplished any of its goals*
Earlier in July, Secretary of Commerce Hoover and
Secretary of State Hughes had agreed to sending a technical
30
study mission "to Russia to study the economic situation*"
The proposal was broached to the Soviets through the United
•tates Ambassador to Germany Houghton* The reply by Chi-
cherin, on August 28, 1922, reflects the delicate nature of
relations between the united States and Russia at that time*
As for the admission into Russia of an American
committee of experts or of inquiry, which would ob-
viously be a step of greater bearing, involving much
more difficult issues, the Russian Government would
consent thereto if a certain reciprocity was admitted}
namely if Russian commercial delegates were allowed
to visit the United States of America in order to
study the American market and trade conditions. 31
Official Washington was just as sensitive, however, and
replied that "no Soviet commission could be received in the
32United States because of the danger of propaganda*"
II, 825.
31
Schuman, op * cit • , p. 221*
30U*S. Department of State, Papers , 1922 , op * cit *.
Ibid *, p* 830*
The New York
quote of reply text*)
Times , August 31, 1922, 3:1. (Partial
oe
87
Chicherin ended the dialogue on September 16 by a statement
In which he called for the restoration of Soviet-American
economic relations, but on a basis of equality and reci-
33procity.
The position of the united states and its European
Allies over the debt problem was, then, somewhat ironical*
The Western-European Allies were demanding reparations of
Germany* The United States demanded its just debts from the
Western-European Allies* Simultaneously, both were making
similar demands upon Russia* The whole picture can only be
understood as a "complex of international monetary claims
that dominated relations among the great powers in the wake
of World war I*"34
In point of view of international law, a good case
could be made for the validity of both the Allied claims and
at least a portion of Soviet counterclaims* The Soviet
Government unleashed its original order of repudiation as a
blow at "international capitalism," but soon found its
revolutionary ardor cooled in the face of the sober reali-
ties of daily economic life* This accounts for the continual
modification of the Soviet stand over its responsibility for
33
U*S. Department of State, Papers , 1922 , op * cit*
,
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Kennan, Russia and the West , op * cit*, p. 191*
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repudiated debts and nationalised property. Whether the
Soviet Government would have lived up to any promises if
credit had been forthcoming is conjectural* A safer state-
ment would be that Soviet Russia was simple unable, as was
most of Europe, to pay such debts*
For the United States, the official view was that
past obligations must be recognised as evidence of good
faith* As long as repudiation and confiscation were ad-
hered to as principles of conduct by the Soviet Union, the
United States could not consider recognition* Thus, the
Republican Administrations of Harding and Coolidge made debt
payment a direct prerequisite of recognition*
aMioDiq to*
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CHAPTER VII
TRADE AMD RECOGNITION
On July 7, 1920, the United States removed the re-*
strictions on trade with Soviet Russia* American diplomats
and consular officers were instructed, however, to take no
action which would "officially or unofficially, directly or
indirectly, assist or facilitate commercial or oth<> deal-
ings" between the United States and Soviet Russia* By this
action, the United States, in effect, lifted an embargo on
trade relations which had been Imposed February, 1918, upon
Soviet Russia by a policy of refusing to issue export li-
censes with that country* It was evident, however, that the
Department of State was less concerned about the lifting of
2
the embargo than about its policy of nonrecognition*
The announcement of the Department of State of the
lifting of the embargo stated that "restrictions which have
heretofore stood in the way of trade and communication with
Soviet Russia were today removed by action of the Department
of State" with the exception of "materials susceptible of
immediate use for war purposes • " It was emphasised that the
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the united States . 1^20 (Wash-
ington :*" Government Printing office , 19 36 ) , III , pp* 717-719,
The New York Times . July 10, 1920, 14:4*
im
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status of political recognition of the Soviet Government by
the United States was not changed by the action* Trade
would be carried out by individuals and corporations at
their own risk, because "the assistance which the united
States can extend to its citizens who engage in trade or
travel in some foreign country cannot be looked for in the
3present case*"
Despite the evident distaste of the State Department
for lifting the embargo, the action was almost evitable
result of the removing of the blockade of Soviet Russia by
the Allied Supreme Council in January of 1920* Many of the
nations of the world had then moved to resume economic rela—
tions with Russia* President Woodrow Wilson had attempted
to achieve unity of Allied actions in all dealings with
Soviet Russia, but his plans failed and each of the Allies
4pursued its own independent policy* Thus, the American
move was politically an expedient, so as not to lag too far
behind the remainder of the world on the matter of furthering
trade in any quarter*
In 1920, the desire to trade was a national concomi-
tant of the existence of people and nations* The Bolsheviks
3Statement to the Press, July 7, 1920* Text in The
New York Times , July 8, 1920, 1$2*
4Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward
Russia Since 1917 (New York: International' Publishers,
T3OT77 pnw:
—
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realized full well the magnetic attraction of profit and
felt that they could turn this urge of "capitalism" to their
own advantage. This premise was correct, even if it did not
bear full expected fruits for the Bolsheviks. In the in-
stance of the United States, trade relations remained the
chief point of contact over the years until eventual recog-
nition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933.
However, the belief of the Kremlin that normal relations
would follow when the need for formalizing trade relations
became evident was not to be realized.
One of the first efforts of the Soviet Government to
break the commerce barrier between Soviet Russia and the
United States was the abortive attempt of Mr. Ludwig C. A. K,
Martens on March 19, 1919, to gain recognition as the repre-
sentative as the People 1 s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in
the United States. Martens* credentials were accompanied
by a memorandum extolling the virtues of Soviet Russia and
expressing a desire to negotiate the opening of commercial
relations between the two countries. Martens was ignored by
the Department of State, but he remained in the United
States, attempting with little success to establish trade
operations, until his deportation in January, 1921. As nas
5
Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-
1923 (New York: The MacmillanTc*ompany, 1961), III, ll"27~"
see also, supra
, pp. 62-63.
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been previously mentioned, anti-Communist emotion in the
United States, in addition to Department of State disap-
proval, rendered Martens* position untenable from the onset
•
One of the problems faced by Martens in his efforts
to establish trade relations was the question of Soviet pay-
ment for desired goods* American businessmen were willing
to sell, and the Soviet Government was eager to buy; but the
question of payment was next to impossible because normal
credit channels were cut off. Gold would have been an imme-
diate answer, but the July, 1920, embargo lifting did not
raise a ban imposed in the same year on the acceptance of
Soviet gold by the Mint and Assay Offices of the United
States* The prohibition had been imposed since it was
maintained that the repudiation by the Soviet Government of
Russia's state debts and its confiscation of foreign prop-
erty left the title of any gold coming from Russia to be
legally in doubt*
This problem was partially alleviated on December 20,
1920, when the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve Board announced the suspending of "all rules and
regulations restricting the exportation of coin, bullion,
and currency to that part of Russia now under the control of
the so-called Bolshevist Government." Alao suspended were
Schuman, op * clt* t p* 257*
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all rules and regulations "restricting dealings or exchange
transactions in Russian rubles, or restricting transfers of
credit or exchange transactions . • « effective December 18,
7
1920, until further notice* n This action was helpful, but
it still did not solve the basic Soviet problem in the areas
of obtaining long-term credits or disposing of its gold on
the united States market*
At the beginning of the year 1921, then, there were
no "formal legal restrictions on the exchange of commodities
between Russia and the united States" with the exception of
ft
"the export of war supplies* w The different character of
trade with the Soviet Government in that American business-
men had to deal with the Soviet State rather than with
private businessmen worked against Increased commercial ven-
tures* The United States Department of State would give no
assurances of the safety of any transactions* This, in
effect, constituted a tacit official discouragement of trade
attempts* Combined with the practical limitation of lack of
long-term credits and the threat of legal confiscation of
Soviet gold, it can be appreciated that the course of Russo-
American trade was a hazardous one*
The potential of the Soviet market was too great an
7
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Inducement to overcome, however* Once the doors to Soviet
9
trade were opened, the total volume increased rapidly* The
adoption of the New Economic Policy in 1921 by the Soviet
Government, undoubtedly, stimulated Russian interest in
trade* This expansion of trade took place without the usual
assistance from the facilities of the united States in such
a case. Organisations did arise to facilitate the trade*
The Products Exchange Corporation was founded in New York in
1919 and began effective operation when the economic embargo
was lifted in 1920* The London branch of the Soviet trading
company, ARCOS, opened a New York Branch in 1924* In May of
1924, the Products Exchange Corporation and ARCOS merged to
form AKTORG, which thereafter was the chief trading agency
in the United States*
A decided incentive for American businessmen was the
signing of the Anglo-Russian trade accord on March 16, 1921,
by Sir Robert Home and Leonid Krassln* This agreement
notably came just a week after Lenin had given to the Tenth
Party Congress his proposals for a tax in kind on agricul-
tural products. The tax was to be an important part of the
11New Economic Policy.
9Robert Paul Browder, Origins of Soviet-American
Diplomacy (Princetons Princeton University Press, 195 i)
,
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In any event, the Anglo-Soviet trade pact was the
first of several such pacts to be made by Soviet Russia in
the following two years* The pact involved a de facto
British recognition of the Soviet Government, trade resump-
tion, repatriation of prisoners, deferment of settlement of
financial claims, and a reciprocal declaration to refrain
12from hostile acts*
What was the official attitude of the united States
over the matter of trade and recognition in the case of the
Soviet Union? Samuel Gompers, the president of the American
Federation of Labor, queried Secretary of State Hughes about
this in a letter of March 15, 1921:
There is much propaganda being circulated in the
United States claiming that the demand for manufac-
tured goods in Russia is so great and the purchasing
power of the Russian Soviet government so vast that
it is almost impossible to determine the actual
capacity of the Russian market to absorb goods of
foreign manufacture*
It is alleged that the Federal Reserve Board has
refused to permit the transfer of funds to the United
States from the Soviet Russian government in order to
pay for the goods, although payment in gold is guar-
anteed*
Another claim is that if the restrictions placed
on trade with Russia were removed it would place in
operation many mills, shops and factories now closed
12Schuman, op * cit * » p. 127.
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down and would give employment to the unemployed of
America*
Gorapers went on to repeat condemnations of the Soviet Govern-
ment by the American Federation of Labor and to ask for a
13
"publication of the facts N by the united States Government.
In his answer to Gompers on April 5, 1921, Hughes
made a point of stressing the economic prostrations of
Russia and the fact that "the unfortunate situation • • •
described is [not] likely to be alleviated so long as the
present political and economic situation continues* " While
other nations of the world were also nearly economically
destitute, these other nations were taking actions to re-
store "confidence while "the attitude and action of the
present authorities of Russia have tended to undermine Its
political and economic relations with other countries."
Consequently, the Russians were unable to obtain needed
credit. The resulting effect "is that Russia is unable to
renew normal economic activities* • • •"
Although the Russians had placed "perhaps six and one
half million dollars' worth of orders," the resulting ship-
ments had been small "because the Soviet agents were unable
to pay cash or to obtain credit so as to insure the delivery
of the goods ordered." It would be useless to recognise the
13U.S. Department of State, Papers . 1921 , op . cit.
,
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"so-called Soviet Government" in the hope of increasing
trade because Russia "does not today have on hand for export
commodities which might be made the basis of immediate
profitable trade with the united States ."
In this reply to Gompers, Secretary of State Hughes
was i in essence, stating two principles upon which he was to
stand for the whole of his tenure as Secretary of State.
First, recognition of the Soviet Government would bring
about no marked increase in trade because Soviet Russia was
in no position to carry out any such trade; and, two, Soviet
Russia was not going to see any improvement in its situation
until it changed its political ways* This stand of Hughes
was evidenced again and again*
The letter of Maxim Litvinov to President Harding has
15been previously mentioned* In it, Litvinov asked for
United States recognition of the Soviet Government and
passed on from the All Russian Central Executive Committee
"a formal proposal of opening trade relations between Russia
and America* • • "
Hughes* s reply on March 25, 1921, stressed the fu-
tility of the existing trade possibilities in Soviet Russia
and that "fundamental changes" would be necessary to restore
14Ibid *. pp* 769-770.
15Ibid *. pp* 762-764* 16Ibld *. p. 764.
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17productivity* By coincidence, on the same day that the
Litvinov communication had been received, Herbert Hoover,
the new Secretary of Commerce, issued a statement on Russian
trade which backed up the stand taken by Secretary Hughes.
The question of trade with Russia is far more a
political question than an economic one so long as
Russia is under the control of the Solshevlki. Under
their economic system, no matter how much they moder-
ate it in name, there can be no real return to produc-
tion in Russia, and therefore Russia will have no
considerable commodities to export and, consequently,
no great ability to obtain imports • • • • That requires
the abandonment of their present economic system. *°
On December 6 of the same year, Secretary Hoover
again expressed his views on the subject to the Secretary of
State* The occasion was a proposal to encourage "Germany as
an intermediary" for future trade with Russia. Hoover could
not agree to the proposal as "being in American interest."
At the present moment, although other powers have
recognized the present Russian government and we have
refused to do so, yet Americans are infinitely more
popular in Russia and our Government more deeply
respected by even the Bolsheviks than any other. The
relief measures already initiated ... and ...
other factors, will enable the Americans to undertake
the leadership in the reconstruction of Russia when
the proper moment arrives.
The hope of our commerce lies in the establishment
of American firms abroad, distributing American goods
under American direction; in the building of direct
17
Ibid., p. 768.
18The Nev York Times. March 23, 1921, 1:2.
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rican financing and above all, in the installation
of American technology in Russian industries.
It can be seen that Secretary of State Hughes and
Secretary of Commerce Hoover thought basically alike on the
problem of Soviet Russia* It was inevitable that the influ-
ence of two such strongminded individuals would prevail in
the Russian operation, particularly in view of the relative
impotence of President Harding and his successor, President
Coolidge, in international policy making*
The basic approach of both Hoover and Hughes with
respect to Russian trade was that, since Soviet Russia was
incapable of carrying out a worthwhile trade, there was no
sense in the United States becoming involved in any trade
program which would involve changing the basic stand of non-
recognition toward the Soviet iSnion. Restoration of politi-
cal relations could have little or no economic effect because
of the economic vacuum which existed inside Soviet Russia*
American-Russian commerce was, of necessity, based upon
economic factors which were hopeless as long as the Bol-
shevik regime remained in power* An exchange of Ambassai
and Consular representatives would be useless because the
Soviet state monopoly for all sales and purchases would
leave no opportunity for encouraging business*
19U*S. Department of State, Papers, 1921, op * cit.
,
II, 787-788.
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The primary object of the United States was to see an
economic rehabilitation of Russia. This meant, of course, a
Russia which would be both capable and willing to carry out
its international responsibilities* It followed that this
desired condition could not be achieved as long as Russia
was dominated by the Bolsheviks*
By the same reasoning, long-term credits were not
granted to the Soviet Union because the United States failed
to recognise Soviet Russia, b cause Soviet Russia had
not lived up to its international obligations in canceling
debts, confiscating foreign property, and promoting world
revolution. Thus, recognition, per se, would not alter the
problem and credits still could not be granted as long as
Soviet Russia continued a program of repudiation*
As has been stressed previously, one of the major
differences between the Wilson Administration and that of
Harding over the problem of its recognition of Soviet Russia
was a shift in emphasis from a moral repugnance to a more
material base* In the field of trade promotion with the
Soviet Union, there was a similar shift of emphasis from
Wilson to Harding* Wilson desired the economic rehabilita-
tion of Russia, but such a desire never became a controlling
factor as it did in the approach of Charles Evans Hughes to
the problem of trade*
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There are some other general comments which can be
made in this same area* For Soviet Russia, the overriding
need was for credits, both long and short term, in order to
get its economy moving. Lenin, from the first, was inter-
ested in obtaining specific agreements to help Soviet Russia
out of its immediate financial difficulties* He was not
interested in compromising his revolution any more than he
was forced to, but he was willing to bargain—up to a point.
Of the Russian aims for credit, trade, and recogni-
tion, the West was willing to come quickly to terms only on
trade—as long as long-term credits were not mandatory.
Bven in the l&Jited States, the major nation which remained
hostile longest to the Soviet Union, trade expanded despite
lack of official protection for investments* The United
States was not so rich and powerful that it could refuse
business dealings with the Soviet Union, but it certainly
was not going to go out of its political course to win its
trade.
rxS
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to draw
together the various aspects of the situation created by the
refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet union
from 1917 through 1923* As previously stated, these years
form a fruitful entity for study because they encompass a
phase of United States-Russian relations which culminated in
the largely static political relationship of 1923* The rela-
tive paucity of pages devoted to Russia in the Department of
State • s official Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States between 1923 and 1933 is sufficient proof
of this fact* By the end of 1923, the attitude of the
United States toward the recognition of the Soviet Union was
well summed up by the blunt, even rude, reply of Secretary
of State Hughes to I»itvinov*a letter to President Coolidge.
For good reason did the Soviet Foreign Office cease to bring
up the topic in official conversation* It was left to
President Franklin D« Roosevelt to initiate the review of
contacts in 1933 which led to the recognition of the Soviet
Union by the United States*
The summarization of the years from 1917 through 1923
See supra » p* SO*
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falls naturally into two categories. First, there is the
nature of the recognition problem—-the principles involved
and a comparison of the actions taken during the Democratic
Administration of President Wilson and the Republican Admin-
istrations of Presidents Harding and Coolidge. Second,
there is the question of the soundness of the recognition
policy followed during the time period* Was the American
stand a wise one or should the United States have joined the
general parade toward recognition of the Soviet Union by the
major powers of the world during 1924 and 1925? The first
category has been already covered in some depth; the second
has not.
What, then, were the basic principles upon which
recognition was refused to the Soviet Union? Did the United
States abandon the traditional de facto policy of past years
•
Was the policy an extension of the one pursued toward Latin
America, particularly Mexico.
One of the striking features of history is that,
although some few men put their individual stamp upon its
course, in retrospect, it is often discovered that a pre-
dictable pattern has evolved. Thus, Woodrow Wilson advanced
a recognition policy based largely upon the personal moral
conviction that he acted for the good of mankind. Yet, if a
man of more traditional cast had been President of the
United States, it is doubtful that the recognition policy of
: *i»
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the United States towards the Soviet Union would have been
substantially changed in 1923* By this, it is meant that
President Wilson and Secretary of 3tat >es each repre-
sented deep-seated concepts long ingrained in the American
political composition* While they may have disagreed in
specific interpretations of recognition policy, they both
agreed to a basic policy which reflected their common herit-
age*
In this particular situation, it is somewhat super-
fluous to stress the legal aspects of recognition. Tradi-
tionally, in international law, no government is legally
bound to recognise another* The ne^d for diplomatic inter-
course between nations, while a basic one and inherent to
the nature of the system, is a policy over which each nation
exercises discretion*
It is also a principle of international law that
every state has a basic responsibility to respect the inde-
pendence of other states and to refrain from acts deleterl-
2
ous to the safety and security of other states* Both
Wilson and Hughes accused the Soviet Union of not upholding
a basic legal responsibility in this respect* Despite the
weakly-rmasoned , even ridiculous denials of the Soviet
Union, it was obvious to all the world that th& Soviet
Charles Cheyney Hyde, International Law . Chiefly as
Interpreted and Applied by the ifnited 5ta£es ( Boston?
Little, Brown and Co., 1922Y, I, 84-85
*
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State, the Soviet Communist Party, and the Comintern were
closely linked. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union
stood legally at fault in this respect*
In a matter so political as recognition, it is nearly
useless to attempt to rely upon legal analysis and legal
approaches. While Woodrow Wilson initially refused to
recognize Soviet Russia on the grounds of the doubtful sta-
bility of the U.S.S.R., such a stand became steadily less
valid. Certainly by 1920, W i realised that the de facto
requirement for recognition had been met by the Bolshevist
regime. The Soviet Government was in effective control of
the state. When Wilson immediately recognised the Provi-
sional Government in March, 1917, he was acting for political
reasons. For political reasons, he continued to fail to
recognise Soviet Russia and so did the Republican Adminis-
trations of Harding and Coolldge.
Recognition for both President Wilson and Secretary
of State Hughes was, then, a political weapon. They both
desired to change the nature of the Soviet political con-
trol. Both had in common, as has been pointed out, a deep
distaste for the world revolutionary nature of the Soviet
regime. More specifically, however, Wilson based his pri-
mary charge against the Bolsheviks on the moral ground that
they were a minority who had come to power by violence in
the overthrow of a constitutional republican government. As
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such, they did not represent the will of the people end,
therefore, could not be recognised. Hughes took a more
legalistic stance of stressing the failure of the Bolsheviks
to live up to international obligations by repudiating
debts. This is not to say that Wilson did not require that
a nation fulfill its international responsibilities, for he
did. Wilson was simply less ready to support American
material Interests than was Hughes.
Wilson objected to the unconstitutionality of the
Soviet Government in that it did not represent the will of
the people* Hughes, in a letter to Samuel Gompers, as has
been mentioned, refused to accept such an approach. The
will of the people could be demonstrated by "continued
acquiescence" by the people in a government. As such,
Hughes repudiated the Wilsonian approach. Still, there is
reason to dispute Hughes *s declared lack of interest in
Russian internal affairs* One of the objectives stressed
by Hughes was the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet
Union* This would require a "fundamental change" in the
Soviet governmental approach before recognition could be
extended* Therefore, Hughes was in a practical sense very
much interested in internal Soviet affairs, and for him to
demand some change on economic grounds was perhaps less
valid a reason both legally and morally than Wilson's un-
constitutional approach by reason of minority rule.
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It has been shown that in some respects the recogni-
tion policy of Wilson, coming as it did between the Adminis-
trations of Taft and Harding was something of an anomaly*
In the traditional use of the term de facto , Wilson broke
with the policy of de facto recognition* He harked back to
the policy of Seward-—being even more positive than Seward
in stressing constitutional procedure*
It is easy when speaking of a subject such as recog-
nition to attempt to simplify it to the point where the
original lessons of history can be lost* Such has been the
case of de facto recognition* Thomas Jefferson is commonly
given credit for the American practice of de facto recogni-
tion* Yet, what Jefferson intended by his recognitions!
principles was lost somewhat in a subsequent rush to simplify*
Jefferson believed that if the "will of the people" was
rightfully expressed, then the two chief aspects of recogni-
tion by American standards—stability and the capability to
carry out international responsibilities—the latter encom-
passing the willingness to carry out responsibilities also—
were by definition satisfied and recognition should be ex-
tended* The main point is that a government with the "will
of the people" properly satisfies the de facto definition,
but there is also the possibility of de facto requirements
being met without the will of the people being properly
expressed*
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The original meaning of de facto did not change , but
the Jefferaonian idea of the "will of the people" often did*
De facto , effective control, and the people's will make a
very neat package
,
particularly if one la willing to accept
expedient values* By way of example, one might note that
Charles Evans Hughes spoke of the will of the people being
expressed by "continued acquiescence*"
All of this does not invalidate the theory of tradi-
tional American recognition policy and its Jeffersonlan
base* It does mean that the threads of "the will of the
people" and de facto must be woven together with some cir-
cumspection* The writer suspects that Jefferson, as a prac-
tical politician, might well have agreed with Charles Evans
Hughes as a matter of necessary political expediency*
Finally, the position of Woodrow Wilson on recognition,
while certainly not traditional de facto was perhaps closer
to that of Thomas Jefferson than many others have heen*
The recognition policy of Presidents Harding and
Coolidge, as expressed by Secretary of State Hughes, marked
a return to the general policy of Presidents Roosevelt and
Taft. It clearly did not continue the Wilsonian theory
since it stressed Soviet recalcitrance in fulfilling inter-
national obligations rather than consideration of Soviet
constitutional character* In the sense that Hughes said
that "stability" was essential, but was not everything, the
mJQ0
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Republican approach to recognition was also clearly not a
traditional de facto one*
To fit the recognition policy of the Harding and
Coolidge Administrations into a particular niche is diffi-
cult* There was a high regard for material interests of
American citizens but also a high regard for constitutional
procedure at times which was reminiscent of Wilson's policy*
For example, Wilson carried his Latin American policy over
into the Russian policy* Hughes was consistent in that he
utilised the same policy toward Russia that he had used
toward Mexico* At the same time, Hughes approved in prin-
ciple the 1923 Central-American treaty of peace and amity at
Washington* Certainly, the Soviet Government did not meet
the standards required for the approval of a revolutionary
regime as contained in this treaty and which had in prac-
tice been applied in Central America since 1907* Yet,
Hughes did not challenge Soviet Russia on any such grounds of
constitutionality*
We must accept the Hughes's policy for what it ap-
peared to be—a legalistic approach well suited to the tenor
of the times* The mood of the American people during the
1920 's was isolationist, conservative, and preoccupied with
material interests* The debt position taken by Hughes
toward Russia represented but a portion of a large picture
of world debts owed to the United States* In the trade
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issue v the United States was very careful to separate
legality from trade.
Perhaps most important of all, there was, in the
early 19 20* s, a very deep hostility toward Soviet Russia and
Communism* This hostility had become a part of the public
consciousness and was a legacy from the days of the "Red
scare.'* This was a political fact which could not be ig-
nored. The emotion was, In fact, shared by the leaders of
America. Herbert Hoover was a prime example. Thus, behind
the legal facade of an accusation of a failure to live up to
international responsibilities lay a very deep antipathy for
the Soviet Government and what it stood for* The principles
of Communism were inimical to an American way of life and
philosophy which was held almost sacred by American leaders.
Hughes was voicing this outlook when he said, "Most serious
is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of
this country.** He could say this and mean it, despite the
fact that actual Soviet propaganda efforts in the United
States had been feeble and, certainly, no serious threat to
the stability of the United States.
This brings us to the question of whether the policy
of the United States was the right one* Should the United
States have recognized the Soviet Union at an earlier date—
See supra
, p. 50.
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for instance, In 1924 when most of the major nations of the
world accorded recognition to the Soviets? As a background
for considering such a question, it would help to keep in
mind the results of final recognition in 1933* The recog-
nition took place on November 16, 1933, in the form of a
number of communications between Roosevelt and Litvinov. In
addition to immediate recognition, there were agreements as
follows! A mutual pledge to abstain from hostile propa-
ganda; freedom of worship for American nationals in Russia}
legal protection, on most-favored-nation terms, for American
nationals, to be included in a consular conventions a waiv-
ing by the Soviet Government of all claims arising out of
the American intervention in Siberia from 1918 to 1921*
Further, there was an understanding that the matter of the
Russian debt would be cleared up by the Soviets at the
4
earliest opportunity*
Following the recognition, it soon became apparent
that the new era which had been hoped for between the United
States and Soviet Russia was not going to live up to origi-
nal rosy promises. Differences continued to plague rela-
tions* Once the Russians gained recognition, they refused
seriously to consider the debt settlement* The same thing
4See United States Department of State, Papers Relat-
to thft Foreign Relations of the United States , Russia ,
3£T9*5 ""( Washington j Government Printing Office, 1952).
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had happened to Great Britain and France, but the united
States chose not to include a debt settlement as a part of
the original agreement. Whether a debt settlement could
have been obtained at all is questionable, of course, but
the passage by Congress of the Johnson Act on April 13,
1934, in which credit was refused to any nation which had
defaulted on previous debts owed America, effectively served
to inhibit trade despite a provision which exempted the
Export-Import Bank from the Act*
In addition to the failure of trade to improve to any
great extent, the old question of propaganda popped up
again and again. Following speeches by American delegates
at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on July 25, 1934,
Ambassador to Russia Bullitt protested that the no-propaganda
clause of the Washington Agreement had been violated* The
Soviets replied, as previously, that they were not respon-
sible for the Comintern. In effect, all of the quick re-
sults hoped for by the United States failed to materialize.
Was the American position, as it stabilized in 1923,
a good one? First off, it is necessary to dispel some illu-
sions* There is a school of thought which would advance out
of hand the reasoning that the United States should have
recognized in the 1920* s* This is an approach which is ever
quick to criticize the men and methods of the past* The
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problems of the world were not solved in the past, ergo the
approach in the past was wrong*
This type of reasoning can very often be misleading
because it is based upon judgment out of context* There
were very good reasons both for and against recognizing the
Soviet Union in the 1920*8, and they must be understood if
the lessons of history are to have real value for the
present and the future*
The United States should have recognized the Soviet
Union earlier* Such early recognition would Ideally have
been conditioned by an awareness of the political realities
of the problem* That is, it would have been futile from the
first to hope for immediate advantages in a situation keyed
to the "long haul*"
The position of the United States was unrealistic in
several respects* In the matter of debts, it soon became
obvious that anything short of substantial credit advance*
ments would not alter the Soviet position* Further, in view
of the fact that America's share of Russia *s war debt was
only 7 per cent compared to the 70 per cent of Great Britain
and the nearly 20 per cent of France, any settlement with
the United States would have had repercussions in Europe*
Prom Rapallo on, Russia had managed to secure an uneasy
peace in this quarter* Even the most obtuse statesmen of
the period must have grown weary of the protracted and
•..
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sterile wranglings over the matter of debts and reparations*
In the long run* Soviet Russia obtained from Europe the
trade and recognition she desired without sacrificing her
position on debts, but at a great sacrifice in the failure
to obtain long-term credits*
There can be no doubt that the policy of nonrecogni-
tion built a mutual wall of Ignorance and intolerance be-
tween the United States and Russia and thus fanned the
embers of a psychology of hostility which still exists. A
premium was placed upon finding points of disagreement
rather than any area of mutual agreement which could lend to
an abatement of antagonistic emotions*
The admitted purpose of nonrecognition was to force a
change in the Soviet position* The supercharged emotions of
anti-Communism, however* caused a perceptible lag in the
American public awareness that a revolution had occurred in
Russia which had achieved a good degree of permanency and
which must be treated on such a basis* This lack of aware-
ness of reality by the American public and American states-
men is a serious charge which is often leveled by critics*
That is, the American position too easily becomes dogmatic
and rigid and thus Incapable of flexibility and expedient
movements when an original situation changes*
In carrying out a policy of nonrecognition, American
statesmen, then, hoped to force or "coerce" a change in the
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Soviet approach. The United States has been able to make
and unmake governments in certain areas of the world (such
as Latin America), but the position of the Soviet Union was
not comparable to a Latin American country* Coercion by use
of recognition will work as long as power considerations are
favorable* Even considering the basic weakness of the Bol-
sheviks, the past and potential power positions of Russia
should have served to warn against such tactics, especially
when America's former Allies refused to join in any con-*
carted effort*
There is basis for a charge that the whole of the
American approach was based on a concept of the Russians as
underdogs* The Russian desire to be treated as equals was
broadly overlooked* In fact, the Bolsheviks insisted upon
it from the beginning* This is why, in 1922, when the
United States sounded out Russia to ascertain if a United
States Technical Commission would be welcome to study eco-
nomic conditions in the U«S*S*R* t the Russians replied that
they were willing provided they were allowed the same privi-
leges in the United States* This point of equality was a
diplomatic nicety which the United States seemed to insist
upon bungling*
In defense of the American position, it is patently
unfair to judge men and their actions out of the context of
their times* The American statesmen who guided the destiny
itr> *»r£* *
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of the United States during the period in question were, on
the whole, a dedicated and intelligent group whose loyalty
was unquestioned. They were men of prudent judgment who
liked to act on the basis of facts. It is often overlooked
that reliable intelligence was often lacking to the states-
men of that period. Limited and discreet moves were almost
a necessity if serious blunders were to be avoided—espe-
cially in a situation so obscure as the Russian one. It is
quite understandable that Charles Evans Hughes would fail to
see any practical advantages to be gained by recognition.
He could see, for instance, that once the United States
recognized Soviet Russia it also recognized Soviet Russian
laws regarding nationalization and appropriation of private
property. Living in another generation, it is easy to lose
sight of the problems of another. The American statesmen of
the 1920* s fully believed, and with good reason, that they
were acting for the good of the nation in not recognizing
the Soviet Union.
Why then should the United States have recognized
Russia earlier? This involves the judgments of George
Kennan which were advanced in the introductory chapter of
this paper ( supra , pp. 3-4). It has been shown that Ameri-
can diplomacy in the 1920 , s sought to provide a predomi-
nantly legalistic basis for recognition in substitution for
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Wilson* s predominantly moral one* The Republicans believed
in their stand, and they also realized how unconvincing it
was in a cynical world of national and self-interest to
stand on moral principle primarily* Yet, they did not per-
ceive the potentially-disastrous effects of what Kennan
calls the "legalistic-moralistic" approach*
The belief that in the international field it should
be possible to gain acceptance for some system of legal and
moral rules which will bring order out of chaos may be a
wonderful dream* In the realm of practical international
politics, it is a pernicious hoax* It is so because there
is no judicial entity which is capable, or has the power, of
making the necessary judgments for states* The states,
themselves, jealously refuse to give up this sovereignty*
By causing its believers often to ignore the true
nature and international significance of international
political problems, the legalistic/moralistic approach takes
away from the political actor the skill and will needed to
act* The setting of the 1920*8 made the selection of this
approach the expedient one, but this does not make it right*
An argument as to whether international politics is moral or
legalistic or both is really beside the point* The
"legalistic-moralistic" approach leads to inaction* It
gilds the status quo * Politics based upon truly enlightened
9m
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national Interests may be many things, but it is not quies-
cent* As Kennan states:
History has shown that the will and the capacity of
individual peoples to contribute to their world envi-
ronment is constantly changing* . . . The function of
a system of international relationships is not to in-
hibit this process of change by imposing a legal straight
jacket upon it but rather to facilitate it, to ease its
transitions, to temper the asperities to which it often
leads, to isolate and moderate the conflicts to which
it gives rise, and to see that these conflicts do not
assume forms too unsettling for international life in
general* But this is a task for diplomacy • • • * 5
Our policy of nonrecognltion of Soviet Russia was
mistaken in its long continuance in the 1920 's* American
diplomacy became rigid and inflexible on the question of
recognition of the Soviet Union and, thereby, sacrificed the
function for which, by definition, it existed. The United
States should have recognized the Soviet Union in the 1920 *s
and was long overdue when it finally recognized in 1933*
Our schoolboy disappointments over the results in 1933 were
indicative of how little we really understood the problem
and of how similar the prejudgments of 1933 were to those of
1923* The n^eci is for the American people and their politi-
cal leaders to arrive at an increased political sensitivity
which will enable them to separate supposition from reality
and to translate reality into concrete terms of positive
political action on the world scene.
York
5George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New
i The New American Library, 1952), p. 85.
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